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Introduction
The integration of southern schools during the Civil Rights Movement was no small feat.
On September 4, 1957—three years after the Supreme Court ruled that segregated education was
inherently unequal in Brown vs. The Board of Education—nine black students attempted to enter
the doors of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Recruited by Daisy Bates, president
of Arkansas’ chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the
nine students arrived on the first day of school to meet an angry white mob blocking their entry.
Governor Orval Faubus himself had deployed the Arkansas National Guard to block the students,
claiming it was for their own safety. Following the first thwarted attempt to enter the school,
NAACP lawyers, including Thurgood Marshall, fought for a federal district court injunction that
prevented Faubus from blocking the students again. Three weeks later, escorted by police, the
nine students entered Central High, only to be rushed home by the same officers, fearing for their
lives. Still fighting to integrate the high school, Martin Luther King Jr. sent a letter to president
Dwight D. Eisenhower imploring him to support the “Little Rock Nine” enrolling at Central
High. He wrote that failure to do so would “set the process of integration back fifty years,"
insisting that this was, "a great opportunity for you and the federal government to back up the
longings and aspirations of millions of peoples of good will and make law and order a reality.”1
By September 25, the Army’s 101st Airborne Division was in Little Rock, escorting the nine
students into the school. Before the 1958 school year, Governor Faubus closed the doors of all

1

"Little Rock School Desegregation." Birmingham Campaign | The Martin Luther King, Jr., Research and
Education Institute. September 04, 1957, accessed November 12, 2018.
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fo r itt e o

high schools to avoid the federal mandate to integrate, only to have the

Supreme Court order their reopening the following year.2
When one pictures the bitterly contested battles for racial equality in the 1950s and 60s,
the picture is most often in the South. The Little Rock Nine story was a news sensation, as the
nation watched these black adolescents march solemnly into Central High School while “an
angry crowd of 400 white men and women jeered, booed and shouted, ‘go home, n******s,’”
and “several hundred militiamen, with guns slung over their shoulders, carrying gas masks and
billy clubs, surrounded the school.”3 Over a thousand miles north of Little Rock, the New York
City Board of Education clashed with Black activists who demanded equitable resources and
opportunity for children of all races. And a decade after the Little Rock Nine fought their way
through white mobs to attend their classes, Black and Latino children would push their way
through crowds of white protestors blocking the entrance of Junior High 257 in Ocean HillBrownsville, Brooklyn.
————————
The Brown decision and its subsequent implementation offer an important question:
Are segregated schools inherently evil, and is integration the on

so tion to ne

a s hoo s

The statistics that illustrate the effects of segregated schooling are indeed staggering.
According to a 2016 Government Accountability Office study, the number of schools
segregated along racial and economic lines doubled between 2000 and 2013. And at majority
Black and Latino schools, students have fewer classes like math, science and college prep. In
2
3

"Little Rock School Desegregation."

Benjamin Fine, "Arkansas Troops Bar Negro Pupils; Governor Defiant," The New York Times,
September 1957, accessed November 12, 2018.
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ew or

it , the achievement gap between Black and white students has ontin e to grow.

In 2018, the National Assessment of Achievement Progress reported that 48 percent of white
fourth-graders were proficient in math, while only 16 percent of black students met the standard.
With a gap of 32 percentage points—growing 5 points since 2015—Black children in New York
are consistently behind their white peers in academics.4
This opportunity gap continues to grow due to many factors, like housing segregation,
discrepancies in school budgets and resources, and more. But as this gap grows, is school
integration the best option for Black and Latino students to excel academically? To many Black
historians and scholars of education, the answer is a resounding no. Thomas Sowell, dubbed “the
intellectual fountainhead of the black conservatives”and “[President] Ronald Reagan’s favorite
black intellectual,” by Newsweek in 1981, argues that all-black institutions with little funding
have been historically successful. In his piece “The Education of Minority Children,” he focuses
on the case study of Washington D.C.’s Dunbar High School. In 1899, Washington D.C. had four
operating high schools: three white, one black. That year, Dunbar High School scored higher
than two of the three white schools on standardized tests. While educational researchers have
contended that those who perform well on standardized tests are middle class, Dunbar reflects
the opposite reality. In 1892, of the 83 known occupations of Dunbar parents, 51 were laborers
and one was a doctor. Sowell argues that historians and educational researchers refuse to
acknowledge the successes of schools like Dunbar—self-selecting, academically rigorous, allblack public institutions—because test results and academic behavior of these students suggest
that they fit a middle-class description. Between 1870 and 1955, the vast majority of its 12,000
4

Nicholas Rizzi, "Achievement Gap Widens For NYC Students Of Color: Report," Stone MountainLithonia, GA Patch, April 10, 2018, accessed November 12, 2018.
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students went onto higher education, many student attending Ivy League Universities and
competitive liberal-arts colleges.
On the other end of the political spectrum sits Russell Rickford, a forty-three year old
associate professor at Cornell University and author of We Are an African People. Rickford
offers an Afro-centric, black nationalist perspective of all-black institutions, arguing Pan African
Nationalist Schools of the 1950s and 60s were successful examples of segregated institutions that
empowered Black youth to excel outside of a white scholastic environment.
hro gho t the

s an

s,

a

an

atino arents parents grappled with this same

question as they fought to desegregate the city’s schools. The Brooklyn chapter of the NAACP—
led in the late 1950s by Reverend Milton Galamison of Siloam Presbyterian Church—battled
with the Board of Education to outline concrete integration plans for years. He and the NAACP
insisted that the city redraw school district lines and bus black students to higher performing and
better funded white schools.5 After leaving the NAACP, Galamison founded the Parents
Workshop, an organization designed to empower Black and Latino parents to educate themselves
about the New York City school system in order to demand high quality education for their
children. They pushed the city to adopt a plan of school-pairing, where Black and white students
from different neighborhoods would attend one institution, forcing the relocation of both Black
and white children in order to create racial balance in schools.6 For integrationists like
Galamison, the primary way to ensure educational equity was to have Black and white students
sit side by side in the assroo , re ei ing the sa e reso r es, istening to the sa e essons,
5 Adina

Back, Up South in New York: The 1950s School Desegregation Struggles, PhD diss., Department
of History, New York University, 1997 (New York, NY: New York University, 1997).
6

ibid.
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and existing within the same conditions.
But for some, the battle to integrate New York City schools was a fruitless one. With a
consistently hesitant Board of Education and continuous backlash from white parents—as seen
in the Parents and Taxpayers group of 1963—some Black and Latino parents sought other means
to ensure educational quality for their children. To them, integration rested on the assumption
that Black children needed the proximity of white children to succeed academically. And for
many parents and community leaders in 1960s New York City, this assumption perpetuated the
conflation of “good schools” with “white schools.” As Harlem community leader Preston Wilcox
asserted in 1966, “If one can believe that a predominantly ‘de facto segregated’ white school can
be a ‘good school’, then, one must believe that a ‘de facto segregated’ and predominantly Negro
and Puerto Rican school can also be a ‘good school.’”7 Rather than rely on the Board of
Education to reluctantly grant Black children permission to attend white schools, parents turned
to “community control” of schools as the best way to achieve educational equity. Neighborhood
school boards attracted parents and local professionals to become involved in their district’s
schools, and schools serving mostly black children turned to more Afro-centric curricula that
better included and engaged its students.
This Honors Project will discuss segregated schooling in New York City during the 1950s
and 60s, and the actors that fought to disrupt the system. Throughout this work, I will attempt to
illustrate the power of community in New York City, for both good and evil, for equality and
bigotry. Parents—Black, white, and Puerto Rican—function as key players in this story, as they

7

Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars: New York City 1805-1973: A History of the Public Schools as
Battlefield of Social Change (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 293.
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continually fought local and state Boards to access the education they believed to be rightfully
theirs and their children’s. I will also assert the notion that segregation was not solely a Southern
issue the similarities between the fight for school integration in both North and South are
striking, and highlight the far reaches of prejudice in the nation both then and now. In the first
chapter, I will discuss the efforts on the part of integrationist activists like Milton Galamison and
Annie Stein. I will document their fight with the Board of Education to adopt concrete plans for
school desegregation in the 1950s and 60s—a fight that culminated in the largest school boycott
in the city’s history. I argue that while integration seemed the only way to ensure educational
equity and narrow the achievement gap between students, local control of schools would ensure
that student needs were met. The second chapter will discuss white backlash against integration
in New York, focusing on the Parents and Taxpayers organization of 1963. This chapter will
illuminate the bigotry of white communities in the North that largely blocked any legislation that
would desegregate schools. This chapter will further bolster the notion that intense bigotry on the
part of white communities was not unique to the South. The third chapter will detail the
" ommunity ontrol" movement of the late 1960s. Supporters of this movement emphasized the
importance of local control of schools and rejected the negative connotations of “neighborhood
schools” that failed to provide for their children. Rather, the ommunity ontrol

ovement

encouraged parents and communities to become involved in the educational sector in order to
meet the specific, local needs of a school that the Board of Education would never recognize. I
argue that community control was a direct response to the failure of integration, and that it
coincided with a the growth of Black Power and “self determination” rhetoric that emphasized
the importance of racial pride.

Page 7! of 93
!
In my conclusion, I will compare the educational landscape of the 1960s New York with
the present day, documenting the transition from decentralized schooling of the 60s to a highly
centralized form of school governance under

a or Bloomberg. I will argue that centralization

has not resulted in any resolution of the achievement gap, and that inequity continues to grow. In
order to understand how New York City can improve public education for all children, it is
integral to look at the “school wars,” as Diane Ravitch puts it, that changed New York schools
forever.

The Players
There are many institutions and individuals involved in the history of New York City
public schools. To fully understand the events surrounding desegregation, one must understand
the central figures organizing around the issue.
One of the most significant players in the fight to integrate schools was the New York
City Board of Education. Together, Mayors and ity superintendents would engage (an ref se
to engage) with the topic of integration throughout the 1950s and 60s. In the late 1950s, one of
the most important figures in the fight to integrate Brooklyn’s Junior High School 258 was
superintendent William Jansen, a man who insisted that the city’s “natural” segregation was
“accidental.” He opposed integration and attempted to make JHS 258 a “separate but equal”
institution.8 In 1959, new superintendent John Theobald would entertain the idea of integration
by transferring 400 children out of overcrowded Bedford-Stuyvesant Schools and into
underutilized white schools in Glendale, only to receive immense backlash from white Glendale
parents and continue to stall on integration plans, insisting that massive transfers of students
8

Back, 107.
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could no longer happen.9 Superintendent Bernard Donovan and Mayor John Linsday would play
the most major role in the 1960s fight for community control, as they worked with community
activists in Harlem, Brooklyn, and Manhattan to create three experimental districts to test the
outcome of local community board’s governance of schools.
Leading the fight for integration was Reverend Milton A. Galamison. Within New York
City, Galamison quickly rose to celebrity status in religious circles as a 25 year old preacher at
the highly respected Siloam Presbyterian Church in Brooklyn.10 Galamison was a political
pastor, delivering sermons that covered topics such as class exploitation and racism. He implored
his audiences to actively fight against these injustices, asserting that is was their Christian
responsibility to do so. He especially despised the de facto segregation in New York City public
schools. Historian Lisa Yvette Waller asserted that Galamison’s passion for school integration
stemmed from his own experiences with bigotry growing up in Pennsylvania, his residence in
Bedford Stuyvesant (where schools suffered from lack of funding), and his belief in Jesus Christ.
She writes,
Galamison began the drive for racially integrated education because he believed that
segregated schooling allowed for inferior housing, underemployment, and persistent
poverty that African Americans faced. Indeed, he argued that the engineers of a racist
American society intentionally used the substandard ghetto school as the tool for
preventing the African American race from enjoying the national promise of liberty.11
Known for his political preaching, Galamison soon grabbed the attention of journalist
Annie Stein and NAACP member Winston Craig to join them in the fight to integrate New
9

Clarence Taylor, Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and the Struggle to Integrate New
York City Schools. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 88.
10
11

i i .

Brandi N. Hinnant-Crawford, "Pulpit, Pews and Picket Lines: Galamisons Fight to Integrate NYC
Schools and the Theology Behind It," Black Theology 14, no. 3 (2016).
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York’s Schools. In 1955, the NAACP elected Galamison to lead their Brooklyn Education
Committee. With the help of Stein and Craig, Galamison founded the NAACP Schools
Workshop, an organization committed to empowering Black parents to fight for educational
quality Brooklyn.12 In 1960, after leaving the NAACP, Galamison founded the “Parents’
Workshop”, which continuously published studies about potential integration plans, researched
disparities in achievement, and largely educated parents and community members about
educational policies that would affect them and their children.13 In 1964, Galamison led the
largest school boycott in the history of New York City, keeping 464,000 children out of school on
February 6.14
The United Federation of Teachers emerged from an amalgam of disparate teachers’
unions in New York in 1960. Headed by Albert Shanker, a for er math teacher at JHS 126 in
Astoria in 1953, the UFT united 106 separate teacher groups into one unit that could engage the
Board of Education in collective bargaining to better work conditions for teachers.15 Soon after
forming in March of 1960, the UFT sent a list of demands to Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr. and
superintendent Theobald, protesting for “raises, pay for a master’s degree, duty-free lunches for
elementary teachers, sick days for full-time subs and dues checkoff, so dues could be collected
via payroll deductions, rather than by hand.”16 When the Board refused to act on these demands,
the UFT set a strike date for May 17, ironically on the Board’s “Teacher Recognition Day.” The
12

Taylor.

13

Hinnant-Crawford, 197.

Heather Lewis, New York City Public Schools from Brownsville to Bloomberg: Community Control and
Its Legacy. (New York: Teachers College Press, 2013), 24.
14

15

Neill S. Rosenfeld, "United Federation of Teachers: 50 Years," United Federation of Teachers 2010 ,

6.
16

Rosenfeld, 2.
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UFT would continue to bargain with the Board of Education throughout the decade, putting forth
lists of demands, and threatening to (often following through with) strike. By 1963, the UFT had
succeeded in their bargaining tactics by securing “a $995 across-the-board annual raise,” and “a
master’s increment, a duty-free lunch for elementary teachers, rotation of teaching assignments,
relief from non-teaching chores and a grievance system capped by binding arbitration.”17 Thus, a
powerful force in New York Public schools, the UFT would play a major role in the city’s
debates around integration and community control.
The Ford Foundation is a liberal philanthropic organization, headquartered in New York
City since its founding in 1936. The Foundation’s main charge in its early years was to solve the
“urban crisis” plaguing New York City, and to assist in the assimilation of migrant African
Americans to the current social order. Because of the rapid “ghettoization” of impoverished
Black communities in the city, the Ford Foundation sought ways to integrate neighborhoods,
starting in the 1950s in a massive campaign to integrate Puerto Rican children into white public
schools.18 With massive amounts of backlash from white communities, the Ford Foundation
turned toward other options of providing quality education to Black and Puerto Rican Children.
By 1966, under the leadership of Kennedy’s former National Security Advisor George McBundy,
the Foundation had turned to ideas similar to “community control” as a way to uplift these
communities from within rather than implying a top-down approach of integration. Coinciding
with the era of Malcolm X’s “self-determination” growing in Black communities, McBundy
seemed a radical activist rather than another white liberal bending to the rhetoric of “separate but
17
18

Rosenfeld, 5.

Karen Ferguson, "The Ford Foundation's Reform From Above in Ocean Hill-Brownsville," Jacobin,
accessed November 12, 2018.
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equal.”19 During Lindsay’s tenure as mayor, with demands for community control coming from
black communities all over the city, the Board of Education turned to the Ford Foundation to
assist in the establishment of three experimental districts. George McBundy’s aid in the process
of decentralization was Mario Fantini, leader of the Foundation’s Division of Education and
Research. He acted as the main channel of communication between the Foundation and Ocean
Hill-Brownsville residents.20
Lastly, the most influential player in the Ocean-Hill Brownsville experimental district
was the local governing board. Made up of community leaders and parents, the board rose to
power in 1967 with the establishment of the new district. Led by “Unit Administrator” Rhody
McCoy, former principal of a “special service” school in Manhattan, the governing board exerted
control over personnel, budgeting, and curricula in their district. 21 Members included figures like
Father John Powis, Reverend Herbert C. Oliver, Hattie Bishop, and Blanche Pile. These men and
women were committed to the idea that local people were better equipped to govern their schools
than a distant Board of Education. As Rhody McCoy insisted in 1996, thirty years after Ocean
Hill-Brownsville, ''Decentralization was a strategic move by those involved to defuse a
tremendous and growing problem—the discontent of the people of New York with their schools.
We decided what kind of curriculum we would teach and who would lead it. That’s community

19

ibid.

20

ibid.

21

Lewis, 40.
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control.’'22 The power exerted by the governing board would erupt in 1968, as the board voted to
transfer 19 teachers out of their district, enraging the UFT and spurring the 1968 Teachers Strike.

Purpose
I believe that this Honors Project will shed light on the most pressing issue of our
generation: educational inequity. Through creating equal opportunity for children to thrive in
school, the United States can begin to chip away at the centuries of systemic racism that has
denied people of color their basic human rights. New York City is the most potent example of the
opportunity gap in the United States. With 1.1 million diverse students, and 1,400 plus public
schools, low income children and students of color are often barred from succeeding in school.23
One in five public high school and middle schools require entrance exams, or base their
admissions on student GPA or standardized testing. These magnet schools are also the most high
performing, and attract wealthier, white families to their districts, further segregating the city by
race and socioeconomic class. I argue that this phenomenon has remained consistent since the
city’s founding. I hope to give a comprehensive account of this history of segregation in the city
in order to shed light on an issue that affects millions of children and families. Education is the
backbone of our nation, and unequal education drives unequal opportunity.

Joseph Berger, "Seeking Change Where It All Began," The New York Times, December 20, 1996,
accessed November 12, 2018.
22

23

"Public School Districts in New York City," New York City Schools.
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Chapter 1: The Board and the Boycott
“Hosanna to the disturbers and overthrowers of immoral and unresponsive government.”
Milton Galamison, “On Disorderly Conduct.”24

By the mid-1940s, the desire to desegregate New York City’s public schools permeated
Black and Puerto Rican communities. With residential areas largely separated by race, the Board
of Education’s neighborhood school model reflected the segregated realities of the city. In the
post-war period, legislation like the 1944 Federal Aid Highway Act and the 1949 Federal
Housing Act—which provided loans and affordable mortgages in the suburbs almost exclusively
to white home buyers—triggered a period of white flight to the suburbs. Moreover, city
“revitalization” projects—like Robert Moses’ 1949 “slum clearance” project under Title 1 of the
Housing Act—created a policy of “Negro removal”. This resulted in the demolition of hundreds
of apartment complexes and the displacement of around 320,000 people—overwhelmingly
African American and Puerto Rican.25 Many of these communities relocated to neighborhoods in
Brooklyn like Bedford Stuyvesant, Brownsville, and Crown Heights.
This segregated residential landscape had a predictable effect on neighborhood schools:
they too became highly segregated. Across Brooklyn, Black and Puerto Rican schools
consistently had poorer materials and facilities, and less prepared and more transient teachers.
Throughout the 1940s, the NAACP reported countless instances of schools denying Black and
Puerto Rican students basic resources, like permanent teachers or textbooks. Black students were
24
25

Milton A. Galamison, “On Disorderly Conduct,” Siloam Presbyterian Church.

Adina Back, "Blacks, Jews and the Struggle to Integrate Brooklyn's Junior High School 258: A Cold
War Story," Journal of American Ethnic History 20, no. 2 (2001), 39.
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also disproportionately tracked into CRMD (special education

asses because of “behavioral”

issues. One parent told the NAACP that her children were denied textbooks by a bigoted teacher,
his reason being, “because they destroyed them.”26
As early as the 1920s, parents and community leaders fought against the treatment of
their children in the city’s public schools one group of Harlem mothers organized themselves
into a group called the “Better Schools Club.” Educational activism was particularly present in
Bed Stuy, as Black parents fought for improved school quality in their neighborhood in the
1930s and 40s. Founded in 1938, the Parent Teacher Association of PS 35 was especially active
in this fight. Led by Amsterdam News columnist Maude Richardson, the PTA protested the
Board of Education for a kindergarten, an evening school for the Bed Stuy community, and a
new building to replace the 64-year old school.27 Using Bed Stuy’s churches, parents, and
community organizations, the PS 35 PTA successfully attracted widespread support at meetings
and rallies at the First African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church. In 1940, Ada B. Jackson took
over the PTA, fighting for better resources for the school and again, a new building. In 1942, she
led a group of parents to protest at the Board of Education’s headquarters to demand an updated
structure to replace their antiquated facilities, illustrating the conditions of poorly resourced
African American and Puerto Rican schools in Brooklyn, and the Board’s consistent dismissal of
them.28
To the Board of Education, segregation in the legal sense, did not exist in New York City.
Rather, as School Superintendent William Jansen contested in 1954, the separation of different
26

Back, "Blacks, Jews and the Struggle,” 42-43.

27

Taylor, 61.

28

ibid.
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racial groups in the city was “natural segregation,” and entirely “accidental.” 29 During the Civil
Rights era of racial tension in the South, the Board of Education in the nation’s largest school
district did not want to admit that segregation was a Northern issue as well. Altogether, the
Board refused to even use the word “segregation,” using “separation” as an alternative that did
not hold the legal implication of the former.30 A “linguistic shift,” as Adina Back puts it, would
illustrate the Board’s official recognition of segregation in their city schools.
By 1954, frustration with the Board of Education was at an all time high. In the wake of
the Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education, which ruled that separate education
was inherently unequal, the New York City Board faced an added pressure to address their
educationa inequity. That year, at the annual Urban League Dinner on February 15, Kenneth
Clark—a renowned black psychologist known for his famed doll experiment that proved Black
children formed an entrenched inferiority complex when segregated from white children—
delivered a speech about the city’s school crisis.31 He explained that New York’s schools were in
a "stage of educational decline,” reiterating the grievances brought up by Black and Puerto Rican
parents in recent decades.32 He discussed school overcrowding, poor facilities, and most
controversially, he accused the Board of purposefully gerrymandering school zones in order to
exclude Black and Puerto Rican students from attending the best schools.33 In one statement, he

29 Adina

Back, Up South in New York: The 1950s School Desegregation Struggles, PhD diss., Department
of History, New York University, 1997 (New York, NY: New York University, 1997),107.
Kristopher Burrell. “Would Brown Make It to New York City? The First Phase of the Battle for School
Integration, 1954-1957.” (Hooks Institute Publications: October 2003), 3.
30

31

Burrell, 2.

32

Back, "Blacks, Jews and the Struggle,” 42.

33

Back, 94-95.
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seemed to call on Jansen directly, discussing the Board’s tendency to deny Northern segregation
as a legitimate claim: “Furthermore, the presence of segregation in the public schools in northern
cities has been used by those who seek to maintain legal segregation in support of the contention
that the pattern of racial segregation is a natural and normal think in a community made up of
people of different races.”34 He called on the Board to conduct a study of lack children’s
experience in school, pressuring the city to take direct action on the issue of unequal schooling.
At first, high ranking administrators on the Board of Education reacted aggressively
toward Clark’s incendiary comments. They attempted to discredit him by fully rejecting his
claims, as Superintendent Jansen declared that “we deny completely that there is segregation
other than the segregation caused by the fact that Harlem is so large.”35 Some even attempted to
“red-bait” him by linking him to the Teachers Union, a known leftist organization. However,
with both the recent Supreme Court ruling and Clark’s public accusations looming overhead
(coupled with Dr. Clark’s prominent role in the Brown case) the Board could no longer ignore the
reality of their declining school system.36 To “show good faith,” president of the Board of
Education Colonel Arthur Levitt allowed Clark to conduct a study on the condition of mostlyBlack schools in 1954.37 Levitt pledged to “fight against ethnic discrimination in the NewYork
City school system.”38 Mayor Robert Wagner also agreed to establish the Commission on

34

Back, 93-94.

35

Back, 96.

36

Burrell, 2.

37

Back, 94.

38

Back, 104, footnote 33.
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Intergroup Relations—a Board-directed committee solely for the purpose of integrating schools
—co-chaired by the outgoing and incoming presidents of the Board.
In conjunction with the Public Education Association an independent organization that
advocated for the bettering of the city’s public schools

Clark set out to study the condition of

Black and Puerto Rican children within the school system. In the fall of 1954, Clark and the PEA
released their 24-page study to the public. In their research, they focused on the issues of
gerrymandering and the discrepancies in educational opportunity, using the question: “Did
schools with predominantly Black and Puerto Rican students offer an inferior education to their
students?”39 Firstly, the report found that schools were indeed highly segregated. According to
the PEA, “71 percent of city schools were comprised of student populations that were either
ninety or more percent white or ninety or more percent black and Puerto Rican.”40
Moreover, the study wielded proof that segregated schools in mostly Black and Puerto
Rican neighborhoods were less able to provide quality education to their students. They found
that on average, facilities used by Black and Puerto Rican schools were “older, less adequate and
not maintained as facilities in predominantly white schools.”41 The buildings had less space per
child, consistently larger class sizes, and fewer specialized rooms. The report also found, using
teacher tenure and high turnover rates as measurements, that teachers at these schools were not
as “competent” as their white counterparts.42 Moreover, schools in Black and Puerto Rican
neighborhoods were more likely to be labeled as “problem schools,” with more special education
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classes and less gifted classes. And across the board, Black and Puerto Rican students had lower
results on standardized testing in reading and arithmetic.43
Yet, the Board chose to focus on the study’s finding that districts were not necessarily
zoned along racial lines. It largely ignored the issue of poorly-maintained schools that increased
a growing achievement gap among Black and Puerto-Rican children.44 To the Board, the task of
intermingling students across neighborhood boundaries did not seem to fall under its purview. De
facto segregation was “natural,” and to disrupt that meant broken communities. Thus, the Board
interpreted the report’s findings as a reiteration of what they already knew: schools were
segregated, but they were not legally segregated by the Board’s drawing of district lines. The
white public’s reaction was similar. One headline in the New York Times from Leonard Buder
declared, “City Schools Cleared In Segregation Study.” Buder reported that “the committee said it
had found no significant evidence to indicate that ethnic separation of pupils was seriously
considered in drawing school boundary lines,” virtually releasing the Board from its
responsibility in segregating schools.45 This public reaction infuriated Clark, as he responded,
“That the Board of Education has been cleared is a misinterpretation of the report,” insisting that
"verbal tricks [had been] used to mislead the public.”46 Still, the Board saw the report as a victory
in their quest to denounce segregation as a Northern issue.
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In 1956, just one year after the PEA report, Black and Puerto Rican parents saw the
planned opening of Junior High School 258 in Bed-Stuy as the Board’s first test of their
s

ose commitment to integration. By the 1930s, Bedford-Stuyvesant housed the largest

population of Black people in the city: by 1957, 66% of the Bedford-Stuyvesant population was
Black.47 Community members and parents recognized that the schools in their neighborhoods
were not delivering a proper education to their children, and fought against de facto segregation
of schools in 1940. Schools like PS 3 on Hancock and Bedford Avenues, an PS 44 on Throop
Avenue were overcrowded, ha shortened their school days from four to six hours because of
teacher shortages, and denied hot lunches to their students because of inadequate facilities.48 In
light of these poor conditions, the Bedford-Stuyvesant School Council demanded integration in
their neighborhood schools—a demand that the Board of Education ignored in the 1940s. In
1956, the Brooklyn branch of the NAACP—led by the Reverend Milton A. Galamison of Siloam
Presbyterian Church and Annie Stein—wrote a memorandum addressed to the Board protesting
the projected placement of JHS 258 and 61. They argued that 258 would ultimately serve a
mostly Black population (98%), and 61 would be mostly white.49 However, they pointed out that
the two schools sat on either end of a twenty-block stretch of interracial housing, and insisted
that the Board redraw district lines and offer transportation so that both schools could have
integrated student bodies for the fall of 1956.50
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Ignoring their calls for integration, the Board stayed the course for their 1957 opening of
JHS 258. Though the new building was built of the “finest stone and steel,” it had the same
problems that parents and community leaders had bemoaned for decades. The school had seven
unfinished classrooms, a majority of substitute rather than permanent teachers, and a large
number of slated teachers already requesting to be transferred to another school. 51 What became
clear was that the Board had no intention of integrating JHS 258. They simply disagreed with the
NAACP’s zoning plan, with Jansen arguing that the school was “practically inaccessible to nonNegro pupils.”52 This case would mark the beginning of the Board’s empty promises of
integration and hesitance to enact any large-scale rezoning plans to racially balance schools. This
case also marks another instance in a long tradition of grassroots organizing in Brooklyn to better
the condition of Black and Puerto Rican schools, as parents and community leaders continually
fought for equal educational opportunity in their neighborhood. One of these community leaders
on the front lines was Milton Galamison, a Presbyterian preacher in Bedford Stuyvesant.

Reverend Milton A. Galamison
Milton Galamison was born in 1923 in a racially divided Philadelphia. He grew up under
the charge of his grandmother, Nellie, left by his father and largely estranged from his mother.
Along with his grandmother, Galamison’s main so ia influence in his youth was church. is
fa i

attended St. Michael’s and All Angels, a small Episcopalian church. Their church life set

a strong foundation for Galamison to feel supported by his community as a youth, even with his
turbulent ho e ife.
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Throughout his childhood, Galamison experienced discrimination in different sectors of
his life. He recalled sitting in segregated movie theaters as an adolescent, and en

ring

ing

by white boys when he crossed into the Italian section of his town, often called racial slurs. He
even remembers being burned by a white man smoking a cigarette, merely for being black.53
Galamison also experienced discrimination while in schoo

ike his older brother, Galamison

was tracked into vocational classes. However, due to clerical errors in his large public school,
Galamison was accidentally placed into a college preparatory class where he excelled
immensely. From high school, he continued onto St. Augustine School—a historical Black
college in North Carolina—in 1940.54
During his freshman year there, Galamison’s inkling for political activism began to
blossom. While the details surrounding the event are cloudy, it is clear that in 1940, Galamison
led a h nger strike to protest the food and/or service in the dining halls. He insiste that after the
strike, teachers were biased against him, and he decided to transfer out of the school after one
year. He then moved onto Lincoln University in Pennsylvania. Lincoln, the first institution to
offer Black scholars higher education, boasted and impressive alumni including Thurgood
Marshall and Langston Hughes. There, he began his studies in the divinity program and
graduated with honors in 1945.55 Convinced by his professors to join Lincoln’s divinity school
due to his success as an undergraduate, Galamison stayed there until 1947. In this time, he

53

Clarence Taylor, Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and the Struggle to Integrate New
York City Schools (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 19.
54

Taylor, 23.

55

Taylor, 25.

Page 22
! of 93
!
became progressively more radicalized through the sharpening of his writing skills and his
ability to articulate his childhood hardships.56
In 1947, he began to preach at Presbytery Church in Princeton, New Jersey, delivering
highly political sermons to his Black middle class audiences every Sunday. He consistently
condemned racial discrimination and the classist nature of modern society, preaching that, “it’s
hate that’s stupid and blind and without reason—like the way we suffer from the hate of some
white people, who simply hate us without bothering to know us.”57 He viewed religious figures
in the Bible as social radicals who fought against injustice, arguing that Jesus was a man who
stood up for oppressed peoples, and that his congregation should do the same.
Well-known for his political sermons and highly regarded in religious communities,
Galamison grabbed the attention of Siloam Presbyterian Church in 1948, after the death of its
hea

aster Reverend George Stark. Siloam was one of the most exclusive Black institutions of

the city, known for its distinguished congregation and its centric force in the Bed-Stuy
community. At the age of 25 years old, Galamison began his career at Siloam and quickly rose
to city stardom. Pushing along his career was his masters degree from Princeton Theological
Seminary, which he received in 1949. His involvement in the radio programs The Dumont
Morning Chapel and Radio Chapel also furthered his career, as he frequently appeared on the
shows to deliver sermons, sometimes including political messages that commented on the poor
treatment of “Indians, Mexicans, Negroes, an
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ears
By 1954, Galamison had risen to prominence not only in the religious sector, but also in

political circles in Brooklyn. When the Brooklyn Chapter of the NAACP heard about the plans
for JHS 258 in 1955, they knew nee e a renowned community leader to join their ranks. Since
Galamison was a radically political preacher at the most influential church in Bed-Stuy—the
projected home of JHS 258—he see e the perfect candidate. That year, NAACP members
Annie Stein and Winston Craig approached Galamison to join the Brooklyn ranch, and
Galamison gladly accepted. As he preached in his political sermons, Galamison believed that
segregation psychologically damaged lack children because it told them that they were
inferior, saying “We contend that within the framework of segregated education both white and
Negro children are crippled emotionally and mentally, irreparably and for life.”59 He argued that
integration was the only way to ensure equal opportunity for all children in schools, and and that
it helped to break down class barriers that were oppressive and anti-democratic.60
a ing oine for es, the trio functioned as a cohesive unit, with each person serving a
distinct purpose. Stein, the daughter of Russian emigres, had moved to New York City after
helping to desegregate lunch counters in Washington DC in 1949.61 After moving to the city,
Stein quickly became active in educational circles, joining a local PTA at the request of friend,
and eventually becoming present of the JHS 246 PTA. Soon after, she joined the Brooklyn
branch of the NAACP and turned her full attention to educational justice for all children. Within
the trio, Stein was the statistician, publishing reports and newsletters on the state of educational
59
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s o es erson. raig, the chair of the organization’s Education Committee, functioned as an
internal organizer, garnering support for the JHS 258 fight within the NAACP.62
In 1955, Galamison, with Craig, became a co-chair of the Brooklyn branch’s Education
Committee and helped to establish the NAACP Schools Workshop, an interracial group
dedicated to helping parents advocate for themselves and their children in Brooklyn schools.63
By 1957, Galamison was the president of the Brooklyn chapter of the NAACP.64 Throughout
his tenure as president, Galamison ensured that the fight for school integration wo

re ain at

the forefront of the chapter, continuing to pursue the case of JHS 258. Outraged by the Board’s
hesitance to adopt any actual plans for integration, Galamison demanded that the Board rezone
the districts around JHS 258. He warned that if the Workhop’s demands were not met, the
NAACP would call for Jansen’s resignation. At the NAACP’s national headquarters, though,
high level administrators like president Roy Wilkins worried that Galamison’s actions were
becoming too radical and urged him to curtail his inflammatory comments.65 Galamison
remained persistent, though in his demands. He was especially angered by the fact that the
Board of Education was more concerned about pleasing white teachers than lack children. In
September of 1957, an integrationist grassroots organization called “Parents in Action Against
Educational Discrimination” protested at City Hall, demanding an equal share of qualified
teachers in Black and Puerto Rican communities. Appearing before the rotesters, Mayor
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st efore the

the meeting, Jansen published a “Progress Report on Integration,” a vague report that claimed
the Board’s purported integration of a number of schools.66 However, during the meeting, Jansen
refused to name the schools where the supposed integration ha ta en place. He also came under
fire for not setting a timeline for teacher transfers, simply stating that he was “working on
that.”67 In response to the 1957 protests and stalling of teacher transfers, Galamison declared:
“We must determine whether the New York City school system exists for the benefit of the
children of New York City or whether it exists for the benefit of the professional staff.”68
he arents

or sho

Throughout his time in the NAACP, Galamison fought for school integration. And though
the fight to end JHS 258 ended in disappointment, the case established Galamison as one of the
most prominent educational activists in the city. After leaving the

in 1958, Galamison

embarked on a new chapter of his career: devoting his time to empowering Black and Puerto
Rican parents—expanding the work he had begun in the Schools Workshop.69 With Stein,
Galamison founded the Parents Workshop in 1959. Their mission statement was clear:
To work for the integration for the schools of New York; [to work] for full and equal
opportunity for learning for all the children of our city; to end all school discrimination
against Negro and Puerto Rican children; and to preserve, improve, and expand our free
and democratic public school system.”70
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The organization believed that Black and Puerto Rican parents needed to take the initiative to
overcome discrimination within the public school system. To do so, parents had to become well
versed in the issues of integration. Initially housed at Siloam, the group was poorly funded, with
memberships offered at the rate of one dollar for individual boosters and ten dollars for PTAs,
which composed a large number of the group.71 Mostly, meetings congregated in Brooklyn and
Manhattan, but the group also had pockets in Queens and the Bronx.
Galamison and Stein’s main charge was to develop leadership skills in parents, urging
them to go to their local schools and inquire about their children’s progress, regularly meet with
teachers and officials, and demand to know how schools are improving standards.72 Moreover,
one of the Workshop’s central tenets was that desegregation was the most powerful way to
ensure educational equity. The organization outlined this belief in a statement to parents:
“The Parents Workshop for equality in NYC Schools is organized to help you and the children in
your school by combining the efforts of all parents in search of full equality, desegregation and a
better education for all children.”73 Galamison strongly believed that integration was the ultimate
goal, arguing that “separate but equal” education was “fallacious and that no educational
atmosphere, however comparable the physical equipment, can provide an equal education if it is
separate.”74
In 1960, Galamison, Stein, and Parents' Workshop leader Thelma Hamilton started the
Workshop’s campaign to force the Board of Education create tangible integration plans. They
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requested to schedule a meeting with the new Superintendent Theobald for April 25. In
anticipation of the meeting, Galamison and Stein encouraged parents to both write postcards to
Theobald with their demands, and to attend the meeting.75 On April 25, 1960, 200 parents
protested at the Board of Education headquarters with the Parents Workshop. At the meeting, the
parents expressed frustration at the lack of opportunity for their children in the current segregated
school system. Galamison argued that the neighborhood school model only affirmed this
segregation and widened the achievement gap. Along with Galamison, several women from
PTAs in Bed-Stuy, Williamsburg, and Brownsville contested that Theobald’s “timid gradualism,”
was more concerned with placating racists than making better schools for their children.76 With
their demands unmet, the Workshop spent the spring and summer of 1960 planning a mass sitout and holding rallies to pressure the Board to integrate. Local leadership within the different
chapters of the organization effectively recruite parents to help them spread the word about the
sit out. “Area captains” would receive a mailing list of churches and local organizations, and
create distribution committees to stuff envelopes and disseminate information about integration
activism. Support from local churches flooded in as well, as they offered to accommodate
families who planned to sit out of schools. Their tactics succeed, as Theobald called a meeting
with the Parents' Workshop one day before the official opening of the school year in September.77
He agreed to implement a new integration program called Open Enrollment—a permissive
zoning initiative that marked the Board’s first official strategy to desegregate public schools.
Open Enrollment meant that black children from overcrowded schools could attend a select
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number of underutilized white-majority schools. As a voluntary program, Black families had to
elect to join the program, meaning that there would be no transfers of white pupils.78
The Board initiated Open Enrollment as a pilot project in the fall of 1960, waiting until
1961 to fully implement the program across the city. The Board of Education’s Central Zoning
Unit selected participating schools based on the racial composition of the student body and rate
of space utilization. For “receiving” elementary and junior highs, the schools had 75% or more
“other” (white) students and were utilized below 90%. For “sending” schools, 90% or more of
the students were Black or P erto Ri an. The sending students would receive an application
from their school that their parents would need to fill out if they want to be transferred.79 The
Parents' Workshop worked relentlessly to make Open Enrollment work for their communities.
The organization published reading scores and locations of receiving schools, publicized
transportation routes, and offered assistance to families applying for the program. Galamison
also established the Jefferson Avenue Educational Center at Siloam, offering remediation in
reading and math so that participating students would have an easier adjustment to a more
rigorous curriculum. One flier circulated to parents read:
THIS IS IMPORTANT! Most of the damage suffered by our children because of separate
and unequal schools occurs in the elementary grades… compare the reading levels of the
sending and receiving schools, and you will see the advantage of transferring your
child.”80
While the Parents' Workshop worked tirelessly to make Open Enrollment a successful
integration plan, Black student participation was limited. Overall, Black families were
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ambivalent about the program, arguing that transferring their children out of neighborhood
schools meant that in order to succeed, children had to ea e black o

nities. Parents also

complained that Open Enrollment put the onus solely on them and their children to integrate
schools, ignoring the responsibility of white families in the fight for educational equity. The
program also created a kind of tokenism, for ing a system in which a small number of the local
schools’ brightest students would transfer, reflecting poorly on their neighborhood.81 Moreover,
parents claimed that they received limited information about Open Enrollment from their
schools. Principals would often circulate Open Enrollment materials at times that there would be
a low response, sometimes refusing to circulate materials entirely.

an school administrators

similarly feared that transferring their rightest students would create a “brain drain” that would
negatively affect their schools.82
Another issue with Open Enrollment was the response from receiving schools. Black
parents feared that their children would be bullied if they attended majority white schools, and
often their fears were realized. In one Open Enrollment school in the Bronx, the thirty transferred
students would have to enter the building through a side door and remained in their classroom all
day—even having lunch and recess indoors and segregated from their white peers. Similarly,
white parents from Flatbush reported that lack children were kept in one tiny section of the
cafeteria. Wholly, the voluntary nature of Open Enrollment proved to be a massive barrier, as the
Board of Education refused to recognize that white families in receiving schools might exhibit
the same bigotry as white segregationists in the South.
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Already by 1963, parents and activists like Preston Wilcox—a professor of social work
and Harlem resident— were disillusioned with Open Enrollment and sought new plans for
bettering neighborhood schools. Hinting at the idea of “community control”, Wilcox condemned
Open Enrollment, arguing that the plan demonized black schools and damaged communities. He
argued that the solution to the school problem was to improve local schools, even if they remain
segregated, proposing a plan to increase services and remedial programs in the HarlemYorkville area.83 This growing sentiment was significant, as it signaled a desire for locally
controlled schools years before the ommunity ontrol movement would fully manifest in the
battle for IS 201.
By the fall of 1963, the Board of Education had abandoned Open Enrollment and moved
onto a new plan called Free Choice Transfer. his

an allowed children from predominantly

black and Puerto Rican schools to attend underutilized white schools, but this plan did not have
strict designations for “sending” and “receiving” schools. Rather, any lack or Puerto Rican
student could transfer to any underutilized white school. Still, this program had limited
participation and failed to take shape because of its voluntary nature. Even the New York State
Board of Education recognized these plans’ ineffectiveness, writing in a 1964 report entitled
Desegregating the Public Schools of New York City:
We must conclude that nothing undertaken by the New York City Board of Education
since 1954, and nothing proposed since 1963, has contributed or will contribute in any
meaningful degree to desegregating the public schools of the city. Each past report, each
current plan, and each projected proposal is either not aimed at reducing segregation or is

83

Waller, 40.

Page 31
! of 93
!
developed in too limited a fashion to stimulate even slight progress toward
desegregation.’’84
Thus, activists began to turn away from voluntary programs, demanding school reorganization
and non-voluntary plans that would force the movement of white students to create racially
balanced schools.
For Milton Galamison, integration and educational equity meant the same thing: he
believed that segregation psychologically damaged students of all races, as it asserted an
inherent inferiority of lack children. In a 1964 interview, he declared,
My opinion is – and I’m trying to turn this over in my mind – my opinion is that the only
real equality for Negroes in America is integration. That is, short of integration he has no
equality. Short of his participation in the mainstream of American life in terms of the
same education that everyone is getting, in terms of the same kind of housing everyone
else is getting, in terms of the same kind of housing everyone else is getting, and in terms
of the same kind of employment that everyone else is getting, he can’t have any kind of
equality. And these areas of life are denied him basically, we feel, anyway, because of
race.85
His faith also spurred his actions around integration, as he believed that fighting for racial
equality was his Christian duty. In his sermons, Galamison would often draw comparisons to the
persecution of Christians to modern day discrimination against lack people. During a
Christmas sermon in 1964, Galamison delivered a sermon about King Herod’s attempt to
murder es s by conducting a mass slaughter of children. The sermon, entitled “What Child is
This?” asserted that children were still being “slaughtered” by systemic racism and unequal
schooling. He argued,
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There are those in our society who are coming to understand that not only are children
being destroyed, but that destruction is connived and deliberate ... it is not an accident
that 85 percent of our children are retarded in achievement. It is not an accident that our
children are not motivated to learn. It is not an accident that the disproportionate amount
of discipline problems are in our schools ...It’s all a part of a gigantic and historic
Herodian conspiracy to cripple and destroy our race.86
Galamison stressed the importance of ensuring the best possible education for the children of his
community. To the preacher, the only way to ensure equitable resources, teacher quality,
facilities, and treatment of students was to have Black and white students sit side by side in the
classroom as equals. 87
he o ott
By 1963, the Board of Education felt the pressure to integrate schools from Galamison,
the Parents Workshop, and other organizations in the city. During the summer of that year,
Galamison organized and chaired the Citywide Committee for Integrated Schools which
included the six it chapters of the NAACP, the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), the
National Urban League, the Harlem Parents' Committee, and the Parent's Workshop for
Equality.88 Together, they threatened a boycott if their demands were not met institute a citywide
integration plan with mass movements of students. By late 1963, Galamison had begun to get
support from other groups, including the Harlem Parents Committee and the NAACP, who
advised him to conduct a one day boycott of schools. For assistance, Galamison reached out to
Bayard Rustin, an organizer in the 1940s for CORE and a former leader of the Young
Communist League. Fearing the boycott’s growing ranks, the Board of Education declared that
86
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et another o n i and report would fail to institute any definitive integration plans, saying “Let
us not be fooled by shallow counterfeit effort to create the illusion of good intention.”89 In a four
and a half hour meeting with Rustin and Galamison, the new Superintendent of Schools Dr.
Calvin Gross promised to deliver a plan to integrate schools by December 1, 1963, with detailed
explanations of the techniques they'll use to institute their plan.90 On December 1, Gross failed to
present any plans for integration. In a succinct yet ominous response, Galamison said that the
Parents Workshop would “answer this breach of faith in due time,” signaling the inevitability of
the boycott.91
Over the course of the following months, Galamison set to work spreading the word
about the impending boycott. Throughout December and into the new year, Galamison held
planning meetings at Siloam with local organizations and civil rights groups. He mobilized
hoards of ordinary people to organize for the boycott, recruiting volunteers to work in boycott
centers producing and distributing information about the boycott throughout the city. One of the
most significant examples of grassroots organization was the establishment of over 500 Freedom
Schools which would operate on February 3—the day of the boycott—from 7:30 a.m. to 5:00
p.m.. Local residents, including licensed teachers, college students, and parents acted as teachers
on the day of the boycott.92 The creation of these Freedom Schools won over parents who were
skeptical of their children sitting out of school for the boycott. They also affirmed a strong
connection between the Parents Workshop and their affiliated communities across the city.
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Another key element in Galamison’s organizing was his ability to utilize local churches
for preparing the boycott. One flier distributed to churches read, “Be sure each minister in your
area has leaflets by Saturday and is committed to distribute them on the day before the Boycott.
Ask him to announce the Boycott from the Sunday pulpit—and make his church available as a
Freedom School or Freedom Center.”93 He even used his own preaching to increase involvement
in the series of boycotts he would plan that winter. In one sermon entitled “The Modern Rip Van
Winkle” Galamison discussed individuals who were "sleeping through" the revolution in the
city. He likened them to Jesus’ disciples who fell asleep while they were supposed to keep watch
to protect him, saying that his congregation’s metaphorical sleeping was destructive to the
children who needed help in the current school crisis:
Black children need to see black faces in textbooks. Black children need to see black
principals administrating the schools. Black children need to read about black heroes in
the history texts. Black children need to feel loved and respected and appreciated. The
youngsters who have dropped out and joined the street gangs and surrendered to narcotics
are not those who have failed in school. They are those whom the school has failed.94
On January 29, fo r days before the boycott, the Board of Education submitted a plan
for integration to the Citywide Committee as a last ditch effort to postpone the demonstration.
But the report contained nothing new—it blamed segregation on housing and claimed that a
mass movement of students would create “chaos.”95 They recognized that the vast majority of
schools with shorter hours of instruction were Black and P erto Ri an, and they offered to bus
those children to underutilized schools. They also offered to create a pairing program that
would be tested in the fall of 1964, but not fully implemented until 1966. The Committee
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re e te these ro osa s an kept the boycott date for February 3, perhaps further fueled in their
anger after the oard’s admission of guilt.96 With the boycott and picket lines carefully
orchestrated by Rustin— n er instruction to have lines be “carried out in a quiet and orderly
fashion”—parents and organizers were ready for the sit-out.
On February 3, 1964, the Board of Education estimated that approximately 464,361
students (around 45% of the city’s total enrollment) stayed home from school.97 Peaceful picket
lines filled the streets at 400 schools around the city, and over 3,500 demonstrators marched to
110 Livingston Street singing freedom songs in the frigid February weather. Rustin and
Galamison were thrilled by the results of the event, with Rustin declaring to reporters that “the
boycott and the rent strike are fair warning that the civil rights revolution has reached out of the
South and is now knocking at our own door.”98
The boycott was a demonstration of the undeniable power of grassroots organizing.
Rustin, the undisputed mastermind behind the intricacies of the protest, and Galamison, the
frontman and voice of the people, had created the city’s largest sit-out in history.99 In an era of
Civil Rights, Galamison appealed to the moral consciousness of New Yorkers who saw a g aring
issue with their city’s segregated schools. More importantly, Galamison utilized the power of
parents who felt that they and their children were oppressed and ignored by the Board of
Education. This demonstration proved that grassroots organizing against Jim Crow era
institutions were not merely a Southern phenomenon. Even scholarship in recent decades posit
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Northern cities as places in which “spontaneous” rioting or protesting against racial
discrimination occurred. As Dorothy Newman, Nancy Amide, and Barbara Carter discussed in
their 1978 work about Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant school protests: “Theirs was not the
carefully organized and skillfully articulated protest of the nonviolent movement in the South.
Thus was spontaneous.”100 But as Waller argues, these scholars ignore the power of grassroots
organizing and civil rights activism in the North, writing: “These analyses posit a passive,
disorganized, inarticulate African American population in the urban North. They presume that
Northern African Americans waited for the struggles of their Southern counterparts to bring them
liberation.”101 School segregation was a Northern and a Southern issue, and Black and Puerto
Rican parents in New York City recognized this fact. Believing that integrating schools was the
only way to ensure an equitable distribution of teachers and resources, city leaders and parents
organized to orchestrate one of the city’s largest protests in it’s centuries-long history.
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Chapter 2: “Separation” Not “Segregation”
Directly following Kenneth Clark’s damning indictment of New York’s segregated
schools, the Board of Education scrambled to address the issue at hand. Having publicly
supported the outcome of Brown v. Board of Education, and insisting that segregation “damages
the personalities” of black pupils, the Board had made clear their intention to equal the playing
field for New York City students.102 However, the Board faced formidable barriers in creating
and implementing integration plans throughout this city. The largest and most hostile of those
barriers was white communities, tirelessly defending their right to neighborhood schools. Fearful
of the Civil Rights Movement creeping up into their city and threatening their way of life, white
parents sprung into action to protest any and all integration plans set forth by the Board. In the
late 1950s, opposition to busing and school-pairing plans took center stage. By the mid-1960s,
formalized institutions dedicated to maintaining segregated school sprung up in the outerboroughs and grew exponentially in membership. This chapter will discuss three phases of white
resistance to integration: first, the unwillingness of white communities and school officials—
including the Board of Education—to recognize segregation as a problem in their city; second,
white anti-busing and school pairing campaigns; and third, the foundation of the Parents and
Taxpayers organization in 1963. I argue that the vehemence of white hostility toward integration
confirms that the battle for school desegregation was not one solely fought in the South, and was
equally as contested in Northern cities.
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Sub-Commission Woes: Baker vs. Jansen
After the publication of the Board-Commissioned PEA study, President of the Board
Arthur Levitt and Superintendent Jansen faced the issue of how to implement the study’s
recommendations while maintaining their denial of “segregation” as a Northern issue. Jansen, an
avowed proponent of the neighborhood school model, was particularly obstinate in this regard.
However, hoping to present the Board as more supportive toward desegregation efforts, Public
Relations Assistant Paul Aron suggested that the Board “show good faith” and set up a
commission to directly address concerns brought forth by the PEA study.103 Thus, the
Commission on Integration was born, consisting of nine Board members, twenty-three civic
leaders (including Kenneth Clark and NAACP leader Ella Baker) and five supervisors. The
Commission was co-chaired by Arthur Levitt, having just stepped down to become state
controller, and his incoming replacement Charles Silver.104
The Commission’s goal was to develop recommendations for addressing problems that
the PEA had pointed out. It had eight sub-commissions with five members each, created to focus
on specific issues: zoning, educational standards and curriculum, guidance, educational
stimulation and placement, teacher assignments and personnel, community relations and
information, physical plant and maintenance liaison, and special committee on research and
materials. Before implementing their recommendations, each sub-commission needed approval
from the Board. The Board approved most recommendations by the Spring of 1956, but the
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Zoning Commission took significantly longer to agree on a recommendation: the Board didn’t
give approval until late February 1957.105
The lag in approval was largely due to difference in opinion within the Zoning
Commission. Coming head-to-head were Superintendent Jansen, opposed to even using the word
“segregation" when referring to the state of it s hoo s, and NAACP representative Ella Baker.
Baker insisted that the Board be held accountable for school zoning, requesting explicit language
outlining that this responsibility fall solely on the Board and not dispersed throughout the
districts to be handled by Assistant Superintendents. She urged the Commission to create a
Central Zoning Unit that would have the power to reshape districts as a direct arm of the central
Board.106 Jansen, resistant to the idea that the Board could even control segregation patterns in
housing and school districts, insisted that doing so would be an “unnecessary slap at the Assistant
Superintendents.”107 Adopting an unspoken policy of the Board, Jansen also maintained colorblind rhetoric that insisted school reform happen to relieve overcrowding, not necessarily to
uplift Black students. Baker argued that in order to actually integrate schools, race needed to be a
factor in rezoning districts. In their months-long battle, Baker succeeded in the commission’s
final report. After 4 drafts, the oar approved the recommendation for a Central Zoning Unit to
which Assistant Superintendents would be answerable. Their recommendation called for the
Central Zoning Unit to draw maps showing the racial composition of schools, and allow for
selective bus transportation to promote integration.108 Though Baker won in her pursuit of
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creating this branch of the Board, implementing the Central Zoning Unit’s re-districting would
be a near-impossible task. Here, white parents and communities enter the story, refusing to
comply with the Board’s new policies and flooding Superintendent Jansen and President Silver
with letters throughout 1957.
Parents’ main concern was the notion of busing both the busing of their children out of
neighborhood schools, and the prospect of busing lack children into their district. The term
“busing” began to appear in news reports and public hearings in 1957. The Wall Street Journal
first warned white parents of this phenomenon directly after the Zoning Unit’s recommendation
to the Board, grossly overstating the plans and warning that white children would be sent to far
corners of the city for schooling. o rna ist Peter Bart warned, after 200 lack children were
bused to P.S. 93 in the Bronx,
This is only the beginning. A ‘master plan’ to speed up the integration process for New
York’s 925,000 public school pupils has been drawn up by the subcommittee on zoning
of the Board’s Commission on Integration. If approved, the plan will take effect next
September. It proposes extensive use of city-financed buses to create racially balanced
schools and suggests that racial integration should be the sole objective of school
zoning.109
He added that the plans constituted an “enforced mass migration of school children.” 110 The
Associated Press issued a similar report, claiming that “The nation’s biggest city has gone
beyond legal requirements that all races be admitted to schools on an equal basis, and is taking
additional direct action to foster interracial student bodies. The move could set a trend.”111
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White Parents Respond
White parents acted quickly to counter the Zoning Unit’s busing recommendations. In
over 2000 letters sent to the Board of Education in 1957, parents berated the Board members:
“Do you gentlemen honestly believe that you can then ship out children back to some slum
school… to spend their lunch hours on streets that are civic cesspools…without a fight on your
hands?”112 On letter from an “Irate arent” read, “Do you think that I and so many others like
me moved to this neighborhood so that our [children] would be uprooted and have to travel to a
place at an uncomfortable distance!”113 Other letters were more clear in their bigotry, with one
parent writing, “The Negro is emerging from ignorance, savagery, disease and total lack of any
culture. Is it necessary to foist the Negro on the White Americans for fair play?”114
Justifying their concern over busing, teacher organizations and parent groups stressed the
logistical issues of sending their children to school far away from home: if a medical emergency
were to occur, for instance, how could parents reach their child? The Teachers Alliance
expressed this fear, challenging the Commission to picture the weight of tasking a teacher with
an ailing child, “Which one of the Commission members has ever had the responsibility of
caring for a nine year old with an acute attack of appendicitis while trying to reach a parent?”115
Parents also feared that their children might miss out on extracurricular opportunities in their
neighborhood if they were to leave the district.116 Others were simply on erne a o t a
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“to New York’s traffic woes.”117 Stoking even more controversy, the Teachers Alliance evoked
Cold-War era Red-scare tactics, arguing that in the case of an atomic attack, bussed children
would be so far away from home that they might be separated in a war-torn city.118
Another tactic white communities utilized to derail segregation was “Red-baiting.”
Specifically, parents targeted the NAACP for its communist sympathies, arguing that re-zoning
children was a communist plot to terrorize New York City schools. An article from The Leader
Observer newspaper in Queens entitled “The Red Plot to ‘Rezone’ Your Children” claimed that
“parents, alert and interested in the welfare of their children are puzzled," a

ing, "they know

that there is no segregation in NYC.”119 White parents in East Queens also received
anonymously sent pamphlets with ominous titles like, “The Ugly Truth about the NAACP” and,
“The Red Hand in New York Schools,” warning that the NAACP was a communist
organization.120
While white parents continued to justify their concerns in terms of logistics and fears of
a communist hand in the system, the most salient motivation for protest in white communities
was their perceived loss of power. The Board stepping in to divide up educational resources and
thus spread opportunity to other demographics was a direct threat to white dominance in New
York. Some parents advised the Board not to bow to “strong Negro pressure groups,” and one
concerned citizen writing from Philadelphia warned, “Do not let the Negro politicians and
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spellbinders mislead you.”121 Some were more overt in their racial stereotyping of lack
students, and simply did not want their children socializing with those they deemed
educationally inferior. One white parent, Mrs. Kolin, asserted, “There is no segregation in N.Y.
City public schools, so why integration,” adding that desegregation of schools might “spread
possible delinquency tendencies rather than arrest them.”122 This sentiment reflected both white
communities’ perception of black children’s inherent behavior and a refusal to recognize
segregation as a legitimate issue plaguing New York’s schools. Others framed their anger toward
bussing around homeowner’s rights. Parents argued that they often chose their neighborhood
because of the school, threatening to leave the district if busing were to take effect. This
confirmed the Board’s fears that integration would drive the white middle class into the suburbs.
In response to threats from white parents, the Board was quick to clarify the specifics of
their integration plans. In a meeting with over 700 white Queens parents, Jansen attempted to
quell busing fears stoked by the media, saying, “These rumors are completely false. No such
action is planned.”123 The Board also validated white communities’ refusal to accept the term
“segregation” into their lexicon when considering the nature of New York City schools. In
memos entitled “Supplement to the Reports” sent out to parent organizations, the Board made
their stance quite clear, stating, “There is no official segregation in NYC; it is outlawed by
statute. However, there is a concentration of certain ethnic groups in some schools in NYC
resulting from the residential patterns.”124 Again, the Board asserted that remedying “natural”
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segregated residential patterns was beyond the reach of the Board. In one meeting with white
parents, Jansen assured that Board “[had] no intention whatsoever of long-distance busing or
busing of children simply because of their color.”125 It also assured that hi ren would not be
bussed from one borough to another; rather, the only busing would take place for kids in
overcrowded schools transferring to local underutilized school. Again, this assurance affirmed
color-blind rhetoric of the Board, as memos refused to recognize race as the defining factor in
school transfers. Finally, the Board assured that all rezoning around neighborhood schools
would depend on parent consolation, ensuring that the Board would bend to white community
concerns over the disassembly of their local schools.
The Sub-Commission’s battle to implement these integration plans set the tone for the
next ten years of educational strife. With a Board fearful of upsetting a powerful white middle
class and resistant to admit that their city was indeed “segregated,” integration of schools
continued to stall. Galamison and the Parents Workshop would fight the Board to take action in
the coming years, but white resistance would continue to dominate in the Board’s eyes. This
trend was especially salient in the battle over schools in the Glendale-Ridgewood section of
Brooklyn.

Galamison and the Glendale Boycott
Two years following the Commission on Integration’s recommendation, the Board had
taken little action in the wa of desegregating schools. The NAACP’s 1959 report, the “Progress
of the Integration Program,” reported that urban areas suffered from de facto segregation and
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thus, inferior education. They pointed to inexperienced teachers and poor physical plants as
further causes of this opportunity gap. In 1954, the PEA reported having 42 segregated
elementary schools and 9 junior high schools in NYC. By 1959, that number had grown to 72
elementary and 12 junior high schools. Five years after the PEA report, Black and Puerto Rican
parents still endured daily attacks on their children who were labeled as culturally inferior, put
into nonacademic programs, an performed poorly in reading and math.126
Black and Puerto Rican parents rightly blamed the Board for an increase in segregated
schools. The Board had issued statement after statement informing the public of their intention to
integrate schools, but were consistently hesitant to fully implement any concrete plans. In 1957,
the Board adopted a plan for permissive zoning—permission to attend school other than your
assigned school—but this only extended to high schools.127 While the Commission on
Integration recommended busing to racially balance schools, Jansen rejected, saying that s h
ta ti s should only occur when schools were overcrowded. Moreover, he required parental
permission before any child could be transferred, effectively bowing to pressure from white
parents to abandon race-based transfers altogether. In 1959, after three years of working with
Black and Puerto Rican parents to transfer children, the NAACP published a report entitled
“Progress of the Integration Program,” highlighting the little improvement in segregated schools.
In a chapter entitled “The City Has Not Kept Faith," the Report reads, “Instead of progress in the
desegregation of the schools, the intervening years have brought rapid extension of segregated
schooling. This has been accompanied by public statements by responsible officials justifying the
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stat s quo under the euphemism of ‘neighborhood school.’”128 It explained that only 90 transfers
had taken place; schools were still segregated, and lack and Puerto Rican schools were
immensely overcrowded. For example, P.S. 287 had 487 students without seats, and students
received less than a full day of instruction.129 500 separate parents all signed petitions to transfer
their students, and each one was denied by the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent of
Central Zoning, illustrating the Board’s hollow intent to ever alleviate overcrowding.
Following the rejection of parents’ pleas to transfer their children out of P.S. 287,
Galamison informed President Charles Silver that parents of the school and NAACP would
formally petition the board for transfers to underutilized schools. The NAACP also requested a
meeting with Silver and board member Gardner Taylor to discuss broader issues of integration
across the city.

shing the Board further to recognize their hypocrisy, Galamison attached a

letter reminding Silver that the Board had already agreed to transfer children out of overcrowded
schools, and that the Central Zoning Unit had the authority to arrange these transfers.130 At this
point, 85% of segregated schools were overcrowded, with one third housing 300 children above
their capacity.
In response to Galamison’s plea, new Superintendent John Theobald agreed to transfer
400 students out of overcrowded schools in Bed-Stuy to Glendale, home to several underutilized
white schools. However, adopting language similar to his predecessor Jansen, he assured the
public that these transfers were simply to relieve overcrowding, not racially
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Celebrating his success, Galamison hosted a rally at Siloam featuring guest speakers such as
Adam Clayton Powell Jr. and a recorded message from Jackie Robinson.131
Hearing of the impending transfers, white Glendale parents sprung into action. In an
attempt to protect their neighborhood schools, Glendale parents boycotted “Chock Full O’
Nuts” coffee, because its spokesperson Jackie Robinson was an avowed supporter of the
transfers. To counter the boycott, Galamison called on both his congregation and other local
churches to double their purchases of that coffee.132 Relentless in their mission, Glendale and
Ridgewood parents organized taxpayer groups to protest the proposed transfers, marching 400
individuals to the Board of Education headquarters at 110 Livingston Street, bearing signs
saying “Neighborhood schools for all,” “Bussing creates fussing,” and “We have just begun to
fight.”133 In addressing the protesters, Theobald stated, "By permitting parents of these children
who are on doubled session, getting only four hours of instruction a day, to send them to schools
within a 3.1 mile radius from their homes in Bedford-Stuyvesant, the Board of Education is not
contradicting the concept of neighborhood schools in which we have always believed. I have
said from the beginning that the transfer of these children would continue only until places were
provided for them in new buildings planned for that Brooklyn area.”134
Moving along with the plan, the Board transferred 400 children into Glendale-Ridgewood
schools in 1959. The students bused to Glendale faced racial harassment, greeted with the phrase
“Blacks go home” scrawled on the front and side of one Queens elementary school. Another
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elementary school exhibited bigoted behavior when the principal ordered a search of all lack
students for weapons based on fa se rumors from white parents.135 Stein, visiting these schools to
assess their progress, witnessed white parents picketing outside the front doors, even watching
one parent spit on a child at P.S. 68 while a nearby police officer refused to act. White parents
also protested the transfers by simply keeping their children at home, conducting a one day
boycott that kept 40% of white Glendale children home. Stein reported that this tactic resulted in
only one school having full attendance on the first day of the 1959 school year.136
The vehemently hostile reaction from white parents toward desegregating schools
illustrates the enormity of the Civil Rights Movement in New York City. Parents at this time even
recognized this, drawing similarities between school integration in North and the South. One
parent organization formed in 1957 called the “Parents in Actions Against Education
Discrimination” was dubbed the “Little Rock Nine of Harlem” by the Amsterdam News.137 And
white hostility toward Black children entering their neighborhood schools would only escalate in
the coming years. The largest and most powerful white anti-integration group would appear in
the early 1960s, and force the Board to choose between equal educational opportunity or white
dominance.
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The Parents and Taxpayers Organization
By 1963, the Open Enrollment plan had been in the works for two years.138 Galamison
and the Parents Workshop had worked tirelessly to make Open Enrollment work for their
community, but progress was slow moving. As evidenced by the previous chapters, the Board of
Education had a very exploitable weakness: it was a very slow to a t bureaucracy, and had never
had a leader ta e the initiative to integrate public schools in a meaningful and efficient way.
White parents saw this weakness and used it further stall integration plans, recognizing their
power as the city’s white middle class and threatening the oard with their potential departure.
With this demographic opposing O en Enro

ent, the Board was hesitant to make any

meaningful actions toward desegregation.
In August of 1963, responding to the threat of boycotting from Galamison, the Board
announced a new integration plan called Free Choice Transfer, which allowed any student in an
overcrowded school to transfer.139 The Board also announced the impending implementation of
the “Princeton Plan,” which would take shape in the fall. This plan called for school pairing,
adjoining Black and white schools within close proximity of each other. It would also redraw
district lines in order to create racially balanced schools. In Jackson Heights, Queens, race-based
pairing would take place at JHS 275. The Princeton Plan intended for the junior high school to be
one-third white, one-third Black, and one-third Puerto Rican.
Jackson Heights residents were not pleased with this plan. With a primarily Jewish and
Italian population, Jackson Heights was home to civil servants, small business owners, and
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families who had a distinct desire for upward mobility. These residents regarded Black people as
lacking ambition, and feared that integrated schools would drag down the achievement-oriented
nature of the community. Thus, the Parents and Taxpayers organization was born in 1963,
directly following the announcement of the Princeton Plan. Lead by Bernard Kessler, a jewish
lawyer; Joan Addabbo, an Italian housewife; and Rosemary Gunning, an Irish community
activist, their man charge was to protect neighborhood schools from Board interference.140 In
reality, their primary concern was protecting their power over New York’s educational sector. As
historian Matthew Delmont argues, the naming of the group “ arents an

a

a ers” effectively

claimed that whites “occupied a higher level of citizenship than black and Puerto Rican New
Yorkers, who were also parents and taxpayers.”141 The name also implie the importance of
homeownership and community to these parents, who attempted to frame their anti-integration
arguments in terms of homeowners’ rights and a community nostalgia. One parent remarked, “I
want my children to go to school where I went to school and that’s just two blocks away.”142
Other parents echoed this sense of ties to their community, with one saying, “This is my
neighborhood. I was born and raised here. Just like my folks. Theres a lot of second and thirdgeneration families out here. It’s a real neighborly place—not like New York City were nobody
cares who lives next door and nobody owns their own home.”143
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While the PAT never took an official anti-Black student stance (they argued that they
only opposed the busing of their children, not the

sing in of Black children), their language

regarding Black people suggested an intense bigotry behind the movement. One member
commented, “I wouldn't live in Harlem for anything in the world. I’d scrub floors. I’d take in
laundry. I’d get any kind of job and I know I’d succeed because in the United States anybody can
do a anything if he tried hard enough… If a Negro lives in Harlem it’s because he doesn't want
to work hard enough to get out of that environment.”144 This comment highlights the group’s
fir

he

belief in the reality of an “American Dream,” and that Black people were

educationally behind because of their lack of ambition. Others believed that bringing Black
children into their schools would decrease their child’s educational ability, with one member
stating, “I don’t know why the Negroes are behind, but they are, and I don't want them hurting
my child’s chances in school.” Another member’s bigotry was even more clear: “If I was God,
what would I do to improve the lot of the Negro? I’d make everybody white.”145
This community sentiment expressed by the PAT spread from Jackson Heights into other
white outer borough areas. By late 1963, there were over 100 chapters in Queens, Brooklyn, and
the Bronx. Growing to over 300,000 members, the group was quick to mobilize in their fight
against integration. In March 1964, the PAT marched from the Brooklyn Board of Education
headquarters to City Hall in Manhattan, calling for Mayor Wagner and Board of Education to
abandon race-based pairing.146 The rally drew over 10,000 parents bearing signs saying, “We
oppose voluntary transfers,” “Keep our children in neighborhood schools,” “I will not put my
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children on a bus,” and, “We will not be bused.”147 Capitalizing on the novelty of a white march
in a Northern city the N

Y

T

reported that “Most of the demonstrators were taking

their case into the streets for the first time.” Reporters from NBC and ABC filmed streets with
long lines of protesters, panning past scores of marchers as they crossed the Brooklyn ridge
and giving them national visibility. One mother, in an interview with NBC, asserted that the
March was meant to imitate protest tactics traditionally used by Black populations: “We feel like
we can prove as much as our opponents to use the same tactics. We have as much right as they
do. These are our civil rights and we’re taking advantage of them.”148 These parents had a
recently executed model to follow, borrowing tactics from Galamison, Rustin, and the Parents
Workshop, who had organized the largest Civil Rights demonstration in the history of the United
States earlier that month.
In response to the national attention afforded to the PAT protest, Rustin and o a Civil
Rights groups sought ways to counter-protest. Rustin and Galamison made plans for a second
school boycott to follow their massive success earlier in the month, saying “WE will be
successful if we can top the anti-integration people by one person… I’ll be happy with 15,00
and one Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and whites.”149 Doris Innis, a member of CORE, reflected on
the PAT protest, and how it changed the course of the Civil Rights Movement in New York:
“When 10,000 Queens white mothers showed up to picket city hall against integration, it was
obvious we had to look for other solutions.”150 Her sentiment was well-founded, as the novelty
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of white protest drew unprecedented attention to the battle over integrated schools in New York.
Media outlets gave equal weight to the PAT protest and other Ci i Rights protests in the city,
including Galamison’s massive school boycott. In specials aired around the PAT protest,
reporters highlighted statements from both leader of the PAT Rosemary Gunning and
Galamison. This tactic illustrated both sides of the argument as equal, making efforts to keep
schools segregated seem much more reasonable in a northern context.151
The PAT’s protest even came up during debates around the Civil Rights Act on Capitol
Hill in 1964. Senator Absalom Robertson of Virginia read to colleagues from the news ticker
from day of the protest, reporting, “Nearly 15,000 parents opposed to planned busing of their
children for public school integration descended on city hall today in the largest civil
demonstration there in years.”152 South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond brought it up again in
April, arguing that “In New York, where students were ‘bused’ around, such a howl went up that
15,000 people assembled in protest against the practice.”153 For these Southern white senators,
Northern white protest highlighted that opposition to integration was happening across the
nation. These senators argued that Northern cities were being protected from busing
propositions, while their Southern states were targeted for integration. The PAT protest had a
lasting effect on the Act, as an anti-busing provision made its way into the legislation.
In September 1964, the PAT organized a school boycott that kept 275,000 home, nearing
the number accomplished by Galamison and Rustin.154 One week after the boycott, the New York
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Times ran a story entitled “Poll Shows Whites in City Resent Civil Rights Drive,” reporting
results from a survey commissioned to study the extent of “white backlash” sentiment in the city.
Author Fred Powledge reported, “While denying deep-seated prejudice against Negroes,” the
majority of white New Yorkers “said they believed the Negro civil rights movement had gone too
far… and spoke of Negroes’ receiving ‘everything on a silver platter’ and of ‘reverse
discrimination’ against whites.”155
Late September 1964 saw the climax of the PAT’s anti-integration campaign, when the
Board of Education announced an official pairing plan for Jackson Heights. In response, the PAT
established a private school to avoid integration—the first instance of such an event within the
modern civil rights movement in a northern city.156 The PAT operated this separate elementary
school for the entire 1964-65 school year and part of the next year, with PAT members and
neighbors acting as faculty and staff. The Board of Education tried to close the school with
threats of truancy against their children, but they could not close its doors until 1966, thanks to
the school’s support from the hundreds of other chapters. While Jackson Heights was the only
place to establish a separate school, white parents across the city reacted aggressively toward the
Princeton Plan. During the 1964-65 academic year, 35% of white students in paired schools left
for other neighborhoods—three times the percentage of non-paired schools. 157
In the end, their protests and threats against the Board of Education worked in halting
progress of integration plans. “Traumatized” by the threat of massive white flight and resistance,
the Board of Education cut back on the planned number of paired schools, while curtailing both
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Open Enrollment and Free Choice Transfer options.158 White community mobilization against
integrating schools illustrates how strongly bigotry permeated New York City during the Civil
Rights Movement. Northern white protest also drew such striking similarities to Southern white
racists that, during the terrorization of Glendale students, a group of Black mothers staged a
counter-protest bearing signs that said, “This is N.Y.C. not Little Rock.”159 Black parents would
soon have to find ways to cope with the Board’s inability to remedy the educational crisis at
hand, as it seemed the white backlash would not cease. The next chapter will discuss steps
taken by Black and P erto Ri an parents to ensure the best education for their children.
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Chapter 3: Community Control and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Crisis
“If the white man turns out to be the villain in this story, such is the testimony of history.” -Les
Campbell, 1968.160
“We must determine whether the New York City school system exists for the benefit of the
children of New York City or whether it exists for the benefit of the professional staff.”-Milton
Galamison, 1957.161
“If one can believe that a predominantly ‘de facto segregated’ white school can be a ‘good
school’, then, one must believe that a ‘de facto segregated’ and predominately Negro and Puerto
Rican school can also be a ‘good school. ”-Preston Wilcox. 162

In the wake of failed protests and wavering attempts to integrate on the part of the Board
of Education, Black parents expressed frustration about the displacement of their own children
from neighborhood schools and into white enclaves. Though Galamison’s 1964 boycott was
regarded as a success in its magnitude—with over 464,000 students (44.8% of the public school
population) sitting out of school to protest the Board of Education’s failure to integrate—Black
and Puerto Rican parents saw little improvement in their city’s schools.163 The Board’s
resistance to integration was arguably heightened by the boycott, as superintendent Bernard
Donovan remarked that the boycott was a “lawless course of action” and that he would not
160

Charles Isaacs, “A JHS 271,” The New York Times, November 24, 1968.

161

Clarence Taylor, Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and the Struggle to Integrate New
York City Schools. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 77.
Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars: New York City 1805-1973: A History of the Public Schools as
Battlefield of Social Change (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 293.
162

163

Heather Lewis, New York City Public Schools from Brownsville to Bloomberg: Community control
and Its Legacy. (New York: Teachers College Press, 2013), 24.

Page 57
! of 93
!
rea t one inch” to the demands of parents and community members.164 Even Galamison,
arguably the staunchest integrationist of the era, felt disheartened by the progress of
desegregating schools, saying in a 1964 interview that
New York City has not made meaningful steps in the direction of desegregating the
school system. They are hedging and avoiding and procrastinating, and managing all
kinds of efforts which are not bringing about the timely and the planned desegregation of
the school system. They feel free to place the onus for integration on some Negroes in
terms of open enrollment, but they do not feel that white children apparently should be
inconvenienced in any way to help bring about a desegregated classroom, and this is the
thing that distresses me.165
Integrationist rhetoric had dominated the landscape of educational equity for over a decade. But
with a resistant Board and numerous unsuccessful integration plans, Black parents saw the need
for a new route toward s ho asti e

it that would increase quality of school for their children

without reinforcing the notion that Black hi ren must attend white schools in order to
succeed. Jerald Podair describes this dissatisfaction with school integration plans. He notes that
busing Black students out of their neighborhoods generated among parents “the feeling that to
receive anything good you must leave Negro neighborhoods.”166

hi e battles with the Board

of Education continued to drag on well into the 1960s, Black parental focus shifted onto
improving the schools in their own neighborhoods, and having a greater say in their makeup.
This shift in thought and desire to create locally-run schools manifested in the community
control movement of the late 1960s.
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Community control as a concept is a significant movement toward an entirely different
form of activism from integration. Community control was a direct response to the failure of
integration, and the continued backlash from white communities refusing to allow integrated
schooling. The movement was a way to reclaim the role of neighborhood schools in a way that
would empower

a

an

erto i an communities to invest themselves in the future of their

children. Neighborhood schools of the past were segregated, dilapidated, and failed to provide
quality education to Black and Puerto Rican children. But community-controlled schools were
institutions governed by the people, and tuned into the localized needs of communities that
were underrepresented and ignored by the white washe Board of Education.

Intermediate School 201
The desire for community control of schools was most apparent in the case of Harlem’s
Intermediate School 201. In the Spring of 1966, The Board of Education’s integration efforts
too sha e in the “Allen Plan,” which promised to integrate schools in areas where interracial
mingling could happen without a mass movement of students—on the border of Black and
white neighborhoods. Harlem’s Intermediate School 201 (for fifth through eighth graders)
would be the first racially integrated school opened under the Allen Plan. The Board intended to
build the school close to the East River on far edge of Harlem, making it accessible to whites
from Astoria and Long Island City.167 The Board then initiated a summer-long campaign in
Astoria and Long Island City to recruit white students to the school, distributing over 10,000
fliers that advertised a chance for “successful living in a democratic, multi-cultural
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and multi-racial city.”168 Still, white parents did not want to send their children to an integrated
school. The plans for the building relocated back to central Harlem. Thus, before the official
opening, the Board of Education revealed that the school would be entirely Black and Puerto
Rican. As district superintendent Daniel Schreiber said, “Yes, I.S. 201 will be integrated—50%
Negro and 50% Puerto Rican.”169 This move enraged local parents. The Board of Education
promised them a racially integrated school, and in a broader sense, to create increased
opportunity for their children to succeed. Organizing into an Ad Hoc I.S. 201 Committee, parents
protested the school plans by writing to Superintendent Donovan. In January 1966, Harlem
Parents Committee leader Isaiah Robinson wrote Donovan, asserting that the “50-50” tactic to
make the school seem integrated “will attract the strongest, most militant protest from this
organization and others allied with us in the struggle for real racial integration of New York City
Schools." e warne that this

o e wo

"turn IS 201 into a battleground.”170 Ignoring their

pleas and continuing with his plan to open the segregated school, superintendent Donovan
appointed Stanley Lisser, a white liberal integrationist, as Principal without consulting IS 201
parents, angering them even more.171
Within EQUAL—a racially diverse organization previously committed to integration—
parents began to tinker with the idea of community control. In a 1966 EQUAL meeting, Harlem
Parents Committee leader Isaiah Robinson jokingly proposed that parents should accept
segregation and run their own schools—an i ea that would change the course of e
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histor in New York it forever.172 One white EQUAL member recalled the events of the
meeting:
Isaiah Robinson suggested, almost as a joke, that since white children would not e
sent into Harlem schools and Black children were not being invited owntown in
any meaningful numbers, maybe the Blacks had better accept segregation and run
their own schools. A jolt of recognition stung all of us: Isaiah’s joke was a prophecy .
t is hard to get across the sudden sadness we all felt. We were close, loving friends.
Now we had to agree to separate because the society would not recognize our
marriage and, one way or another, the Black children had to be legitimized.173
Reacting to the community organization evidenced by the Ad Hoc Parents Council and a
growing disillusionment with integrationist rhetoric, reston
assi e

ono i

eigh orhoo

e eo

i o

the ea er of ar e s

ent i i rights organi ation, or "

" saw an

opportunity to rally parents around the idea of community control. In the winter of 1966, he
circulated a position paper called “To Be Black and Be Successful” which outlined for IS 201 to
become an experimental district under the control of a community members. He called for a
“School-Community Committee” that would be made up of local people and selected by
students and parents. The committee would have broad control over personnel and instituting
new programs within the school. Wholly, the Committee’s main charge would be to engage the
local community in their neighborhood schools.
In March 1966, the Ad Hoc Parent Council met with superintendent Donovan to present
the Wilcox plan, only to be rejected. A month later, during another meeting with Donovan and
Mayor Lindsay, Wilcox proposed a revised plan that gave the Committee the power to hire a
principal. He argued that in order for the principal to be accountable to the community and fully
understand the specialized needs of the school, he must be selected by local people. This
172
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sentiment was a persistent one in this fight for community control, as Black activists contended
that Black society and white society were indeed so different that a white principal could never
properly lead an all-black school.
During the spring and summer of 1966, Harlem parents had all but abandoned integration
as their course of action for IS 201. Empowered by the Wilcox plan, parents were convinced that
community control of schools would ensure educational quality for their children. In the summer
of 1966 Livingston Wingate, Ad Hoc member and executive director of HARYOU-ACT,
Harlem’s largest anti-property organization, declared that “We must no longer pursue the myth
that integrated education is equated with quality education.”174
On September 12, 1966—the scheduled opening day of IS 201—parents and activists
flooded the Harlem streets to protest the segregated, air-condition-less, windowless school.
Parent Sarah Frierson, president of the African American Parent Teacher Association at PS 179 in
Harlem, was one of these parent protesters. Her children were planning to attend this school on
its opening day, as she thought, like many others at the time, that her schools would improve in
funding and teacher quality if white children were bused in. When it became clear that IS 201
would not be integrated, she became a community organizer for educational equity. She argued
that only way to improve Harlem schools was to get parents involved and have them fight for
more than elusive integration plans. On the opening day of 201, she and other Black and Puerto
Rican parents pressured city officials to delay the opening until they published an actual plan for
improving IS 201.175 This protest attracted members from the Harlem Parents Committee,
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EQUAL, MEND, HARYOU-ACT, CORE, SNCC, and the African American Teachers
Association.176 They protested for o

nit

ontro e schools, a Black Principal, and a local

board. They formed a “Parent-Community Negotiating Council” to communicate these demands
to the Board of Education. Though Lisser was able to keep his job due to the immense
negotiating power of the Unite Fe eration of Tea hers—arguably the most powerful entity at
the time in New York’s education system—the fight for community control of IS 201 marked a
dramatic shift in thinking for Black parents who recognized the discrepancies in education
between their children and white children. Annie Stein, wrote of the IS 201 case:
With school reform now open for discussion, Black and Puerto Rican community groups
came to realize—it was almost inevitable—that tinkering with a bureaucracy would not
bring education to their children. If they wanted a school system responsive to
their aspirations, a system which did not blame its professional failings on the children it
failed, they would get it only by running the schools themselves.177
By December 1966, with the Board of Education still refusing to address overcrowded
and unsuccessful schools, parents and community leaders from Black and Puerto Rican
neighborhoods took over the Board of Education’s Brooklyn Headquarters to protest the poor
conditions of their schools.178 As parent Lillian Wagner explained at the demonstration, the
city’s higher income districts across the board had higher salaried teachers, and this attracted a
more qualified staff. In 1966, one in five elementary and junior high students citywide was
reading two years behind grade level, and a two to five year achievement gap existed between
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students in Black and Puerto Rican schools and students in majority white schools.179 As the
Board members hastily attempted to exit the meeting in response to these accusations, the
protesters proudly occupied the empty Board seats and declared themselves the “People’s Board
of Education.” Over the next two days, the People’s Board remained in the headquarters to draft
a statement that called for teacher and administration accountability, and an increased focus on
employing locals as Teaching Assistants in their schools.180
These demands were a drastic departure from the widely-supported calls for school
integration in years past. Two years earlier, Presbyterian pastor and activist Milton A. Galamison
led the city’s largest ever school boycott to protest the Board’s segregationist policies. Now the
president of the “People’s Board of Education” and the founder of the Citywide Coalition for
Community Control, Galamison argued that integration was no longer the solution to providing
quality education to Black and Puerto Rican students. Rather, he e ie e that parents and
community members should push the Board of Education to grant greater rights for community
control of schools. Heather Lewis articulates the inception of this new educational activism:
“Community control was proposed as a grassroots antidote to the Board’s call for yet another
task force report on the problems of education in disadvantaged areas.”181 It was apparent that
the Board of Education would never institute the city-wide population shifts though busing or
redrawing of district lines to achieve true educational integration. Thus, parents argued that local
communities knew the individual needs of their neighborhoods and demanded the right to make
decisions (in budgeting, in teacher screenings) regarding their children’s s hoo s thro gh o a
179
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go erning boards. For Galamison’s “People’s Board,” community engagement in school issues
from parents across socioeconomic status was necessary to ensure all community members
would have a voice.
Finally in November, after months of negotiations between parents and city officials
throughout 1967, the Board of Education—in conjunction with George McBundy of the Ford
Foundation— agreed to set up three experimental districts to test the effectiveness of community
control. The Board of Education granted these experimental districts the right to elect their own
school governing boards, which would make decisions about curriculum, teaching strategies,
resource allocation, budgeting, and ersonne .182 The ultimate purpose of the experiment was to
ensure that parents could “come up with plans that reflect their own felt needs for the education
of their children.”183 They esta ishe one district in Harlem, one on the Lower East Side called
Two Bridges, and one combining the neighborhoods of Ocean Hill and Brownsville in
Brooklyn. 184 All three of these districts represented an opportunity to build on existing
community involvement in schools. In Ocean Hill Brownsville, parents organized themselves
into an independent school board—Local School Board No. 17; in Harlem, parents from IS 201
created the Ad Hoc Council to directly engage with the Board of Education; in Two Bridges,
community organizations including The Two Bridges Neighborhood Council (TBNC) and the
Lower astsi e eigh orhoo s sso iation
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o

nit and instituted programs to engage parents in local schools.185

Ocean Hill-Brownsville
Ocean Hill and Brownsville are adjacent neighborhoods in Brooklyn. In 1966, the two
communities served a similar demographic of largely Black and Puerto Rican families as a result
of white flight in the early 1960s. Outside of the overcrowding and poor facilities in their
schools, Ocean Hill-Brownsville had a host of issues that plagued the community: the
district had an overwhelmingly young population, with 45% of the community aged under 21.
And of those over the age of 25, the majority only had an a erage e

ation of eight years,

illustrating the lack of knowledge about educational quality and school governance among the
Ocean Hill-Brownsville population.186 With a massive population of school age children, Ocean
Hill-Brownsville schools could not accommodate the neighborhood demographic. While the
population was overwhelmingly young and largely uneducated, the residents of Ocean HillBrownsville provided ample evidence of commitment to their neighborhood schools before the
official opening of experimental district. To the Board of Education, Ocean Hill-Brownsville was
the perfect candidate for the community control experiment. In 1967, the Board of Education had
combined Ocean Hill-Brownsville with the very white neighborhood of East Flatbush into one
district Number 17 in an attempt to integrate the neighborhood’s schools. But this move merely
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reate an overwhelmingly white school board that ignored the Ocean Hill-Brownsville voices
of Black and Puerto Rican parents. In response to this, Ocean Hill-Brownsville parents reate
their own independent, unofficial school board called “School Board No. 17” which included
Milton Galamison. Moreover, the “People’s Board of Education” incident in 1966 proved that
Ocean Hill-Brownsville parents were intent on gaining locally controlled schools for their
children.187
The Board of Education’s support for community control was largely due to the approval
from two major city actors: Mayor John Lindsay and surprisingly, the UFT. Mayor John
Lindsay—serving the city from 1966 to 1973—grew up in a white upper class family on the
upper east side. Throughout his mayoral career, he displayed a concern for underprivileged
communities. He feared that New York City was becoming increasingly segregated, saying,
“Our nation is moving toward two societies, one Black, one white—separate and unequal.”188
Attempting to integrate schools across segregated neighborhoods, though, proved to be a nearly
impossible task. As was evident in the case of the Parents and Taxpayers group, his strategies
angered a hostile white middle class. They felt that the Board of Education was ignoring their
children in a system that prioritized integration for the benefit of black children. Thus, Lindsay
liked the idea of community control, because it offered a solution to educational inequity that
would avoid mass movement of students across the city, address the concerns of Black and
Puerto Rican parents, an quell the anger of white parents.
For the United Federation of Teachers, community control was initially a threat to their
influence over city schools. irst founded as the Teachers Guild in the 1930s, the UFT began
187
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its career as a socialist, “anti-supervisor” group that preached socially progressive school reform.
By 1966, though, the UFT had become its own bureaucratic institution; 30,000 members strong,
it virtually co-ran the city s schools with the Board of Education. Superintendent Donovan and
UFT President Albert Shanker were “familiar and cooperative.”189 o the

, ommunity

control meant decentralization of New York City schools. This meant that rather than negotiating
with one central Board of Education—a friendly institution to the UFT—it would have to deal
with many smaller school boards in order to wield any influence.
However, the UFT saw an opportunity in the experimental Ocean Hill-Brownsville
district. In negotiating with the new district’s local boards, the UFT hoped to designate all eight
new Ocean Hill-Brownsville schools as More Effective Schools (MES).190 The UFT designed
the MES program to mitigate the effects of poor school conditions in impoverished
neighborhoods by mimicking small, private suburban schools that had “radically smaller classes
maximum 22 instead of 31 or more), the innovation of prekindergarten, and support services for
students, including clusters of expert teachers, psychologists, social workers and community
coordinators.”191 Because MES schools had more specialized programs, they required more
teachers and specialists, often warranting 2-3 more teachers per class.192 If Shanker and the UFT
could successfully designate all eight Ocean Hill-Brownsville schools as MES, they could
continue to influence hiring and personnel issues in the experimental districts by ensuring
multiple positions per school for UFT teachers.
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The UFT and Ocean Hill-Brownsville residents spent the summer months planning the
new school system for their district. Again, the UFT’s main charge was to designate all eight
schools as MES. Shanker and the UFT expected the local board to exert limited control over
school governance, hoping that Donovan would eventually appoint a district superintendent.193
But Mario Fantini, the education liaison for the Ford Foundation, worked with Ocean HillBrownsville residents to ensure that their governing board would have legitimate control over
hiring, firing, budgeting, facilities, and curricula. Sidestepping oth the UFT and Superintendent
Donovan, the Ford Foundation offered a $40,000 grant for the Ocean Hill-Brownsville project,
routing the funds through local Reverend John Powis’ Our Lady of Presentation Church, and the
Institute for Community Studies at Queens College, an organization aiding in setting up the
experimental district. Their plan was to make the district as separate as possible from Donovan
and the UFT. While Donovan did admit that Fantini’s empowerment of the governing board was
moving too “definitively,” he never reprimanded the governing board or the Ford Foundation for
their actions. He feared accusations of racism, especially after the IS 201 controversy in 1967.
Thus, Ocean Hill-Brownsville residents, with the ICS and the Ford Foundation, set off to create
an elected board, a unit administrator, and plan of operation by September.194
Once popularly elected by community residents, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville governing
board sought to address issues of overcrowding, dilapidated facilities, teacher absenteeism and
turnover, and poor achievement of its students. Board leaders like Blanche Pile and Hattie
Bishop were well-versed in the issues of community organization, and brought these skills to the
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table while fighting to increase instit tiona quality in Ocean Hill-Brownsville schools. Pile, an
early supporter of the Independent Local School Board of District 17 in 1966, was a parent who
knew how to inquire about accountability from city officials.195 In 1966, she requested
information about the reading scores in her district and was denied access, illustrating her
willingness to demand quality in community schools. Bishop, another parent, conducted her
own research about student achievement in the district and discovered that Ocean HillBrownsville students were reading 3-4 years below grade level.196
Before the official opening of the district, parents appointed former “special service”
school principal Rhody McCoy as the superintendent for the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district. As
an advisor for the board during the summer months, he proved a formidable leader in the effort
to increase the district’s school quality. His main charge was to empower parents across class
lines to “defend their political and educational positions” and engage in professional
development to create a community of effective leaders.197 He encouraged parents to practice
their public speaking skills, develop plans to run effective meetings, and publicize the work in
their district to the press. His focus was on creating a governing community that eschewed the
“selfish attitudes and desires to emerge as leaders” often found in PTAs and in bureaucratic
institutions like the Board of Education.198 He also emphasized the importance of young people
in the district’s decision making. As president of the governing board Herbert Oliver recalled,
sometimes board meetings would attract up to 800 people, en o raging o
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responsive policymaking in local schools.199 or McCoy, board meetings were an incredible
representation of the community’s commitment to local education. He recalled: “Oh, It was a
joy to go to a board meeting. Not only were the board members present, but the community folk
was sitting around. And they had as much input as the board members. And it was always on a
positive note—how do we help the youngsters?”200
The teachers of Ocean Hill-Brownsville also felt the community enrichment ta ing

a e

in the experimental district s assroo s. At JHS 271, teacher Charles Isaacs recognized the
district s emphasis on a strong faculty connection to students and their parents. He also
commented on the power of a community rallying behind a school the prioritizes Black student
success—a concept that the Board of Education and former neighborhood schools never did:
If we succeed where others have failed, the explanation will not lie in minor reforms of a
decadent educational system. If the children learn now, it will be because they want to
more than ever before. It will be because they do feel the sense of community which is
developing, and because their parents now participate actively in their education. They
know that their teachers have faith in them, and more important of all, they are learning
to have faith in themselves.201
Before the experimental district, fo r out of fi e teachers in Ocean Hill-Brownsville
were white. After the emergence of community control, young Black teachers flocked to the
district, creating an environment where Black students felt more at home. Eighth grade student
Karriema Jordan commented on this shift in teaching staff, “You felt more accepted. You
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weren t the outsider in your own school. They were a part of your environment. I mean they
were Black, you can identify with them. And they can identify with you.”202
Community control of Ocean Hill-Brownsville also resulted in an increased focus on
Afro-centric education and cultural awareness for its st

ents. Classrooms now included

discussions around African heritage and racial pride. Karriema also noticed this change in
curriculum, commenting that Black teachers “broadened our perspective of looking at things. We
were no longer members of small community called Ocean Hill-Brownsville. We were
broadened to W.E.B. DuBois, Langston Hughes, Malcolm X, Marcus Garvey […] We became
international, and it was a good thing because Black people are the third world and the third
world is much larger than European history.”203
Les Campbell, another teacher from JHS 271, taught African American history in the
experimental district. Throughout his teaching career, the Board of Education labeled him as a
"Black militant," and he ontin a

faced accusations of teaching racial hatred in his classroom.

He was suspicious of the “white liberals” he saw emerging in the fight for equitable education,
and was a fir

believer in the notion that Black people should control their own lives and fate.204

At JHS 271, he taught a class about the origins of Africana civilizations: the building of Ancient
Egyptian monuments, the eventual European invasion that wrenched Africans from their homes,
and the enslavement of Black people in America. He once o

ente on this

rri
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“if the white man turns out to be the villain in this story, such is the testimony of history.”205
According to Shanker, Afro-centric education contributed to the issue of bigotry in schools,
gi ing the

ore reason to t rn against the e

the oar of

ation to e o e s e ti a of its

eri enta

istri ts an

a the fo n ation for

r ose an goa s.

While the board itself was successful in many regards in creating a cohesive governing
unit, they would soon meet immense challenges in their clashes with the United Federation of
Teachers.

UFT Clashes
In September 1967, tensions between the UFT and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville governing
board ontin e to heighten. The UFT had proposed a clause that would give teache rs the right
to permanently remove a “disruptive child” from their classroom without consulting the student
or parents. Moreover, they protested the Board of Education for more schools with an MES
designation in order to create more job opportunities for UFT teachers. Shanker also hoped to
institute a policy that would eliminate erfor an e re iews for tea hers after three years of
experience: in effect, teachers would not be held accountable for lesson plans, classroom
decorum, or criticism from administrators.206 Black and Puerto Rican parents were horrified by
these demands. o them, the disruptive child clause was proof that UFT teachers did not care to
teach oor,

is n erstoo chil ren. When the Board of Education hesitated in granting these

requests, the UFT called for a mass resignation of teachers on September 11, 1967. In the largest
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school district in the country, this 1967 strike forced schools to close for almost three weeks.
Teachers protested under the slogans “Children need the chance to learn” and “Teachers want the
chance to teach,” implying that “disruptive children” hinder the entire schooling process and
should be removed from public schools entire .207
In response to the impending UFT strike, Ocean Hill-Brownsville board member Dolores
Torres vowed to keep the district’s schools open—a move that angered the UFT and its Ocean
Hill-Brownsville teachers.208 Moreover, Rhody McCoy’s appointment of five new principals
from outside the city’s Examination lists (including the city’s first Asian and first Puerto Rican
principals, and two Black principals) was a direct refusal to follow the city’s “merit system” and
seek special approval from the State Commissioner of Education. o the

, this was a

atant

isregar of roto o .209 During the summer before the 1967-68 school year, McCoy and
Reverend John Powis hosted luncheons at each of the eight schools to garner support for the new
principals and teacher representatives for the governing board. But they were met with intense
hostility from teachers who refused to vote on representatives in protest of the governing board.
Eventually, African American teachers would elect representatives to the board, but hostility
between the UFT teachers and governing board members would continue to mount. 210
While the strike was divisive and surely disruptive to the newly establish Ocean HillBrownsville district, it had unintended positive outcomes. During these three weeks, board
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members and Ocean Hill-Brownsville residents filled the open positions left by striking UFT
members and volunteered at schools. By doing so, these board members became even more
confident about the effectiveness of the experimental district, seeing the effects of parent and
community engagement in the schools first hand.211 In a 1988 interview, Rhody McCoy
reflected on the power of parent involvement, saying, “The parents, when they manned the
classrooms during the strike, their eyes opened, their hearts opened, and they began to
understand, or believe, or break that myth that there was something mystical about teaching, and
that they were qualified.”212 After the “mass resignation” came to a close in early October, the
UFT officially revoked its support of the experimental districts and continued to pressure the
Board of Education to weaken the power of the governing board. Soon, UFT teachers’
resentment of the board and district would erupt in the spring of 1968.

Teacher Transfers
In March 1968, Rhody McCoy placed an item on the governing board’s agenda that
would change the city’s educational history forever. He proposed that thirteen teachers and six
assistant principals be transferred out of the district, insisting that “they had demonstrated that
they were opposed to the experiment.”213 Dolores Torres similarly noted that these teachers often
attempted to divide Black and Puerto Rican children, saying “We have people that are telling the
Black children that the Puerto Ricans are against the Blacks. We have to take steps to keep these
people out, to make sure these people are now allowed in to miseducate our kids, because if we
211
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allow this, we are condoning it because we’re paying their salary.”214 After holding a public
meeting attended by community members, the board voted to transfer the 19 teachers out of the
district on May 7, 1968.
While this decision was shocking to the transferred teachers, some Ocean HillBrownsville community members had felt a growing disdain for white teachers since the fall of
the 1967. Parent Elaine Rooke, a member of Brownsville Community Corporation, initially
supported the white principal of JHS 271, Jack Bloomfield. However, even with improving test
scores in the school, Rooke believed that her children were being prepped for blue-collar jobs
that did not exist in her neighborhood, as Ocean Hill-Brownsville’s unemployment rate had risen
to 22%. She also argued that white teachers in general had a “bad attitude,” and were too quick
to rush out of the neighborhood at the end of the school day to retreat to their own white
communities.215 She insisted that white teachers were too different from her children to properly
teach and represent them in the classroom. These teachers dressed differently, spoke differently,
and didn’t live in the community. To Rooke, white teachers were condescending to Black and
Puerto Rican children, and were more interested in promotions and eventual high paying
administrative positions than teaching her children. So, by late 1967, Rooke and other Ocean
Hill-Brownsville parents were suspicious of white (many of them UFT) teachers.216
In response to the these transfers, the UFT demanded that the governing board reinstate
the 19 teachers, claiming that it was illegal to remove them from the district. When the teachers
attempted to come back to school following their transfer letter from the governing board,
214
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community members blocked them from entering the JHS 271 building.217 Fred Nauman, one of
the transferred teachers, claimed that he was never informed of any issues in his teaching,
saying that he was dumbfounded. e arg e that if “sabotaging the project […] means
questioning some of the actions of the governing board, then we must be guilty of this.”218
Following the transfers, 350 union teachers walked out of Ocean Hill-Brownsville schools to
support the dismissed teachers, but the community vowed to keep the schools open and maintain
control of the board.219
By September 1968, a new school year, the local board still refused to take back the
dismissed teachers. Thus, the UFT called for another citywide strike, halting the education of
over one million children. However, in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Black and white teachers
crossed the picket lines in defiance of the union in order to ensure that students would continue
to receive an education regardless of the UFT. The scene at Ocean Hill-Brownsville was one of
chaos and confusion, with an aggressi e police presence and UFT strikers screaming
accusations of “race hatred” at children and teachers as they entered the school doors.220 Student
Karriema Jordan remembered, “You look up and on the rooftops, and across the street from the
school the cops were with their helmet gear, and the playground was converted into a precinct,
and walking up to the school you have just mass confusion. You have the community people out
there, you have the UFT—you were just amazed.”221 McCoy was fr strate
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a tions of the UFT in response to the transfers, publicly declaring, “We are also saddened by the
fact that for the past week the educational establishment of this city has supported the so-called
procedural rights of 19 people above the just demands and educational needs of 9000
children.”222 Teacher Edgar Morris expressed a similar sentiment, angere

the fact that the

wellbeing of students was not being prioritized by striking teachers: “I came into the district
because I want to be accountable to the community. If I’m not doing a good job then I want them
to kick me out. See, this is the only way that we’re going to bring about any change. We have to
be accountable to someone, and in the New York City school system, there s no problems,
nobody gets fired.”223
This battle was a question of priorities in New York City schools. What was more
important: the rights of underrepresented children and parents, or the rights of the teachers at the
front of the classroom? It was also a battle of who had the final say in school governance: a
strong central board swayed by the power of the UFT, or o a communities? While the strike
was a hotbed for parent-teacher conflict, it was also a unifying factor for the Ocean HillBrownsville community. Teacher Les Campbell noticed this trend, sa ing that “groups came
together at rallies and meetings surrounding Ocean Hill-Brownsville—it was an issue that
whether you were poor, or in the NAACP, or the Urban League, or the BPP, or the Republic of
New Africa, you could rally around this community’s issue. Everybody understood the
importance of Black children receiving a quality education.”224
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The scene at Ocean Hill-Brownsville dragged on for seven months, with community
members and the governing board refusing to reinstate the teachers, and the UFT insisting that
the board’s actions were illegal. By October 1968, the Board of Education ha suspended the
Ocean Hill-Brownsville community board, and Donovan ha dismissed Rhody McCoy as unit
administrator. oon after, the oar of

ation entire

eliminated the community control

experiment, for ing Black and Puerto Rican parents to stage a mass protest of the oar , calling
the fight a “struggle against educational colonialism.”225
The events at Ocean Hill-Brownsville and the fight for community control are essential
components in understanding educational equity. So many of the questions raised by Ocean HillBrownsville community members, UFT representatives, and the Board of Education are
questions that plague our current education system. Who can best represent a wide range of
students in the classroom? How do schools combat racial and economic segregation? Is this
segregation a problem, or can it be beneficial to learning? Or, is it like Albert Shanker put it
when he argued that any segregated education creates norms of narrow-mindedness, bigotry, and
cultural isolation? The fight for community control was also a fight between communities and
teachers, posing the question of who should govern schools—a strong central Boar of E

ation

creating standards that should reach every school, or a community board that is more tuned into
the localized needs of the students?
Understanding community control will help to illuminate the issues our current
administration faces while trying to racially integrate schools. This battle over education
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governance will certainly inform the way parents, teachers, and administrators today see
their role in American schools.
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Epilogue
In 1969, after the fall of the three experimental districts, the New York State legislature
passed a school decentralization law establishing 32 community school districts with elected
school boards that were administratively and politically decentralized.226 The 1969 aw e

ains

that the new districts must constitute a “suitable size for efficiency, a convenient location for
pupil attendance, a ‘reasonable’ number of pupils, and ‘heterogeneity’ (ethnic and
socioeconomic mixture) of pupil population.”227 In hiring, creating curricula, and forming the
new schools and districts, administrators were also required to take into account the “common
and special educational needs of the communities and children involved,” fulfilling one of the
explicit goals of community control. The law also replaced the central Board of Education with a
smaller “City Board” comprised of seven publicly elected officials and a chancellor of
e

ation, who would continue to run the management of the city’s high schools.228 Local

community boards, however, were responsible for educational policy in elementary and middle
schools within their district.
For almost 20 years following the policy change, local professionals and parents in some
of the city’s poorest communities worked to increase Black and Latino student achievement in
their districts. They became teachers, principals, and administrators, sometimes remaining in
their respective districts for much longer periods than those who participated in the community
control experiment. One Black activist, J. Jerome Harris, became the superintendent for Bedford
226
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Stuyvesant. Through tremendous resistance, he and other dedicated school administrators were
able to implement some goals of the community control experiment—creating smaller schools;
integrating bilingual, multicultural, and arts education into the

rri

; raising a a e i

standards; and encouraging teacher-led reform.229
However, the city suffered under an economic recession in the 1970s. Subsequently,
progress in the way of education reform suffered right along with it. Urban centers were
becoming more and more neglected by the federal government, leaving school districts with
fewer resources. By 1975, the city's lawyers were in State Supreme Court filing a bankruptcy
petition.230 The city was in shambles, and it showed: maintenance of parks, public housing, and
transportation plummeted, illustrating the city’s declining quality of life. Public schools
especially suffered, as massive staff cutbacks tore through the city, and curricula was pared
down its barest bones.231
The recession of the 1970s had a disproportionate effect on Black and Latino
communities, as their housing burned, city services shrank, and budgets in their schools
plummeted. Along with financial repression, Black and Latino communities experienced
heightened social stifling at this time. For instance, the Black Panthers suffered from severe
repression from police brutality, and the infiltration of drugs in poor communities.232 Moreover,
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in contrast to other issues plaguing the city like housing, and health care, education seemed a
less pressing matter to be addressed, an was set arge

set asi e.

By the 1990s, the city’s decentralized system came under strict strict scrutiny by public
officials, the media, and education advocates who demanded an immediate return to centralized
control. Come 2002, Mayor Bloomberg persuaded the state legislature to abolish community
school boards and entirely restructure the city’s epartment of Education. Calling the seven
member city-board a “rinky dinky candy store” where all the owners are involved in “setting the
price on every tube of deodorant,” Bloomberg painted the city’s education system as
disorganized, ineffectual, and politically paralyzed.233 During his mayoral tenure, Bloomberg
completely dismantled the community system, terminated hundreds of citywide and local
administrators, and threw away local district records, effectively erasing their histories.

_______________________

It’s late June, 201 . Richard Carranza, the newly appointed chancellor of education
arrives at Harlem’s Frederick Douglass Academy to a parent-packed cafeteria. The topic of the
town-hall style meeting? Desegregating the city’s schools. It’s here that Carranza poses the
question on everybody’s minds, a question that has plagued the city for over fifty years: “It’s
important that we put the real issue on the table, and the issue on the table is this: in one of the
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most diverse cities in not America but the world, and in the largest school district in America, a
school district that is public, are opportunities really open for all people?”234
The answer is a resounding no. Lately, conversations about desegregating the city’s
schools have picked back up among education reformers, administrators, and city residents who
see the glaring disparities in opportunity between white and non-white children. This
achievement gap is perhaps most evident among the city’s top public high schools, particularly
the number one ranked high school: Stuyvesant. In 2014, a New York Times headline read,
“Seven black students have been offered a chance to start classes at Stuyvesant High School in
September,” out of 952 total offers. 235 Five years later, almost to the day, the New York Times
published an eerily similar article, with the headline, “Only 7 Black Students Got Into N.Y.’s
Most Selective High School, Out of 895 Spots.”236 In order to gain admission to one of the city’s
top eight public schools, eighth graders must perform exceedingly well on a city-specific
standardized test called the Specialized High School Admission Test (SHSAT). In fact, the
SHSAT is the sole admission factor for these schools. In 2019, 27,000 eight grade students took
the test, with 4,798 receiving offers to specialized high schools. Of those given offers, 10.5%
were Black and Latino, though NYC’s public schools demographic is 66% Black and Latino.237
To David Kirkland, a professor of urban education and executive director of New York
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University's Metropolitan Center for Research on Equity and the Transformation of Schools, this
discrepancy in admission is a clear message:
The symbolic weight of the egregious disparity in enrollment when it comes to
specialized high schools, it says to black and brown populations— particularly the black
and brown families of students—that there is something wrong with your students, that
they're intellectually inferior, that they're intellectually less than, and that symbolic
argument to those students carries weight throughout the system.238
Carranza felt similarly, and his response was immediate and concise. Following the Department
of Education’s publication of 2019 high school admission statistics, he gave a statement saying
that the city was “once again confronted by an unacceptable status quo at our specialized high
schools. We need to eliminate the single test for specialized high-school admissions now.” 239
However, not all parents share Carranza’s same fervor about integrating New York City’s
schools. In April of 201 , parents at P.S. 199, a mostly white, wealthy middle school on the
Upper West Side, held a similar town-hall style meeting; but the shouts filling the cafeteria were
far from pro-integrationist rhetoric. Parents were outraged by a proposed change to their schools
that would increase diversity. The new policy would require each of the 17 local middle schools
to reserve a quarter of its seats for students scoring below grade level on state English and math
exams (the large majority of these students are Black and Latino). White parents argued that their
high performing students would suffer from this policy, and in turn be shut out of the most
desirable middle and high schools in the city. One parent lamented,
You’re talking about telling an 11-year-old, “You worked your butt off and you didn't get
that, what you needed and wanted.” You're telling them, “You’re going to go to a school
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that is not going to educate you in the same way that you've been educated. Life sucks!”
Is that what the DOE wants to say?240
Distraught by parents’ comments, local Principal Henry Zymeck chimed in, saying,
There are kids that are tremendously disadvantaged, that I would love to be able to offer
— somebody mentioned $5,000-worth of tutoring for to raise their test scores. And to
compare these students and say, “My already-advantage kid needs more advantage! They
need to be kept away from those kids!” is tremendously offensive to me.241
These community gatherings are eerily reminiscent of the countless meetings held by
school administrators and parents throughout the 1950s and 60s. Black and Latino communities,
then and now, are confused and upset by the current state of their children’s public education.
White parents, territorial and hostile to change, believe that they and their children worked to get
where they are, and deserve the quality of the education in their neighborhood. Bringing
underperforming Black and Latino st

ents into their schools to take their children’s spots feels

like a punishment for no justifiable reason. It is strikingly clear that the city is stuck in the same
story that began back in 1954, after Brown v. Board of Education. While the question of how
New York can integrate its schools still looming over the Board of Education, one larger
question remains: is integration the best path toward educational equity?
To K.A. Dilday, a parent and executive editor at City Lab, the answer is no. Dilday lives
in Central Harlem—an area with a 30% poverty rate—with her husband and nine year-old
daughter. She insists that the general public believes that she lives this way because racism “did
the dirty” to her. Rather, she claims agency in her decision to live there: “I chose not to have my
daughter tested to enter kindergarten in the gifted and talented programs that feed to specialized
Lindsey Christ, "Student Diversity Push Upsets Some Parents at UWS School,"
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high schools. Nor do I want her to attend a specialized high school. I am choosing for my
daughter to be ‘left behind.’” 242 For Dilday, editorials in the New York Times that lament the lack
of Black students in their schools reaffirm a hierarchy and narrow definition of success that
ignores the strength of neighborhood schools and community ties. She insists that these top high
schools are not the only path to academic and social achievement, and that editorials continually
insist that if a school or neighborhood is largely Black and Latino, it must be bad. She writes of
these assumptions made by others,
Our lives are diminished because we are ‘shut out’ of specialized high schools; our lives
are limited because we live in majority black and brown neighborhoods. Our proximity to
too many poor people, after having started life in middle-class communities, is evidence
of slippage.243
Echoing the tune of Black and Puerto Rican parents at the helm of community control, Dilday
asserts that not every Black and Latino institution is inherently inferior.
Jumping back to 1995, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas e

resse a similar

e ief. In the case Missouri v. Jenkins (93-1823), 515 U.S. 70 (1995), a federal district court
found the Kansas City school district and state of Misso ri guilty in operating an
unconstitutionally segregated school system. To facilitate a detailed desegregation program, the
Court ordered that the school district impose a new tax to raise the necessary funds. In essence,
the Court was encouraging the Kansas City School District to improve its “desegregative
attractiveness,” remedy the issue of white flight from its schools, and bring white families back
into the city. However, the Supreme Court saw this tax levy as a judicial overstep, and reversed
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the or er. Thomas, in a concurring opinion, expressed his continued disbelief of the nation’s
willingness to see all-Black institutions as inherently lesser. He wrote,
It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior […] In effect, the court found that racial imbalances
constituted an ongoing constitutional violation that continued to inflict harm on black
students. This position appears to rest upon the idea that any school that is black is
inferior, and that blacks cannot succeed without the benefit of the company of whites.244
Thomas’ words beg the question: are efforts to integrate often misguided, reinforcing the
stereotype that Black children need the proximity of white children to excel academically? To
both him and community control activists, the answer was and is yes. Integrationist rhetoric,
especially when espoused by white education reformers, often affirms the incorrect notion that
Black and Latino children are inherently inferior when it comes to academics. However, when
considering the future of public education in New York City, is integration a necessary step
toward rectifying systemic inequalities in the city? When considering this question, one must not
forget the findings of Kenneth Clark’s seminal doll study, proving that segregated education does
often inflict psychological harm and create pervasive inferiority complexes for black school
children. Even community control activists recognized the potential greatness of integrated
education, with Paul J. Cooper—executive editor of The Brownsville Counsellor writing in a
1968 Op-Ed entitled “Strategy for Victory”
It is with a great sense of pride that we see displayed throughout the community
proclaiming that ‘Black is Beautiful.’ It is equally important for our young people
especially, not to gain the impression that this is the only color that is beautiful. We
believe that nothing is more beautiful than a united community of Blacks, Puerto
Ricans, an whites wor ing together to i ro e the o ressi e on itions whi h affe t
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Thus, New York City faces the unique challenge of creating a more equitable educational
landscape by increasing opportunities for integration while recognizing that Black and Latino
communities in the city can and do effectively educate children in ways that specifically address
local needs. New York City must also recognize that the Black-white achievement gap is largely
due to disparities in funding and quality personnel, not inherent academic ability. For example,
Robert Dreeben and colleagues at the University of Chicago conducted studies detailing Black
students’ access to educational opportunities. In a comparative study of 300 Chicago first
graders, Dreeben found that Black and white students who had similar instruction achieved
comparable levels of reading skill. But he also found that,
the quality of instruction given African-American students was, on average, much lower
than that given white students, thus creating a racial gap in aggregate achievement at the
end of first grade. In fact, the highest-ability group in Dreeben’s sample was in a school
in a low-income African-American neighborhood. These children, though, learned less
during first grade than their white counterparts because their teacher was unable to
provide the challenging instruction they deserved.246
Thus, while integration might be one way to remedy educational inequity—as white students
receive better resources and higher levels of funding than their black counterparts—it is not the
only remedy. All-Black public education can be a successful enterprise, with the proper
resources, teaching, administration, social responsibility, and community values pushing it
forward. Like community control advocates begged the city to see in the late 1960s, all-Black
public education is not inherently inferior. It is often, in fact, a source of empowerment for
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students, parents, teachers, and administrators. Looking forward, the city’s Department of
Education, when addressing these issues and making necessary changes to their system, will
have to consider closely the wise words of Reverend Milton Galamison:
One minister once said this: ‘Change is one of the most perilous things in the world.
There is only one thing I can think of more dangerous—not to change: to go out into a
new era of international relationships and still cling to old nationalistic ideas, to go out
into a new industrial order implemented with machinery and still cling to the laissez faire
individualism of the eighteenth century.’ These are the very things of which we are
guilty.247
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